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Abstract 
This dissertation comprises three papers that study how external economies of scale help 
to explain geographic variation in access to medical services as well as potential implications on 
the real estate market.  Specifically, the first two papers examine whether an increased 
concentration of the hospital service industry promotes productivity in treating patients and if so, 
what are the specific channels through which agglomeration economies might take place in the 
health care industry.  The third paper explores how the productivity variation is reflected in the 
real estate market.   
Chapter 2 examines two factors that help to explain geographic variation in health 
outcomes.  The first factor concerns proximity to medical services.  The second factor is state-
specific health care policy that may impede access to nearby medical services.  Three key 
findings are obtained.  First, the effect of local doctors on reducing mortality rates of various 
diseases in a county attenuates with distance.  Second, at approximately the same distance, in-
state doctors contribute more to lowering mortality rates in the primary county than do out-of-
state doctors.  Third, the lesser impact of nearby out-of-state doctors is amplified when the 
primary state adopts more stringent policies that restrict entry of out-of-state physicians.  This 
evidence is consistent with labor market pooling as one of the specific channels through which 
agglomeration economies affect productivity.  
Chapter 3 addresses two related questions that help to explain geographic variation in 
access to medical services.  The first question examines the existence of agglomeration 
economies in the hospital service industry.  The second considers whether the sharing of 
intermediate inputs contributes to spillovers from spatial concentration of hospital services.  
Three key findings are obtained.  First, hospitals in more concentrated areas are more likely to 
 
 
 
 
outsource intermediate services to specialized intermediate service suppliers.  This suggests that 
agglomeration economies exist in the hospital service industry and are generated in part through 
the sharing of intermediate inputs.  Second, the presence of nearby small hospitals increases the 
tendency to outsource, consistent with a “Chinitz” effect identified elsewhere in the literature.  
Third, the agglomeration effect attenuates geographically. 
Chapter 4 replicates and extends a paper by Holly, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2010).  Their 
paper uses a panel of 49 states over the period of 1975 to 2003 to show that state-level real 
housing prices are driven by economic fundamentals, such as real per capita disposable income, 
as well as by common shocks, such as changes in interest rates, oil prices, and technological 
change.  They apply the common correlated effects (CCE) estimator of Pesaran (2006) which 
takes into account spatial interactions that reflect both geographical proximity and unobserved 
common factors.  This chapter replicates their results using a panel of 384 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) observed over the period of 1975 to 2010. Our replication shows that 
their results are fairly robust to the more geographically refined cross-section units, and to the 
updated period of study.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Medical services are highly concentrated in a small number of areas throughout 
the United States.  According to statistics published by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, the 
number of physicians ranges from 116.0 per one hundred thousand residents in McAllen, Texas, 
to 319.8 per one hundred thousand residents in White Plains, New York.  Further, patient 
outcomes also vary significantly across locations.  For instance, while the age-sex-race adjusted 
mortality rate stands as low as 25 per 1000 population in Reinbeck, Iowa, it rises up to 203 per 
1000 residents in Chalmette, Louisiana.  In fact, numerous studies have provided evidence on 
geographic variation in the health care industry (see, for example, the Dartmouth Atlas of Health 
Care) as well as its potential consequences on patient outcomes (Fisher et al., 2003a, 2003b; 
Baicker and Chandra, 2004; Fisher et al. 2009, etc).  However, much less efforts have been 
devoted to exploring possible factors that may contribute to this phenomenon.  Undoubtedly, a 
better understanding of this question is important since restricted access to medical services is 
presumably one of the leading causes of poor health outcomes in lightly developed areas.  This 
dissertation helps to explain geographic variation in the hospital service industry from the 
perspective of external economies of scale.  Specifically, it argues that an increased concentration 
of the health care industry promotes productivity in treating patients, and the increase in 
productivity further attracts medical services to agglomerate in select locations.   
Chapter 2 explores whether concentrations of medical professionals help to improve 
doctor productivity, as captured by reduced mortality rates from heart disease, cancer, and stroke.  
This is in line with the agglomeration literature, which has provided evidence that productivity is 
often enhanced when companies operate in concentrated locations (Quigley, 1998; Rosenthal and 
Strange, 2004; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009).  Numerous studies have provided evidence in the 
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manufacturing sector.  Similar spillover effects in the health care industry have been explored in 
a few recent studies.  These studies find significant localization effects: when the scale of the 
local health care industry is large, the patient outcomes improve (Baicker and Chandra, 2010) 
and local hospitals are more likely to outsource intermediate medical services (Li, 2013) and run 
at a lower cost (Cohen and Pall, 2008). 
This chapter, in particular, examines two specific features of agglomeration economies in 
the hospital service industry, in addition to the existence of the localization effect.  The first 
feature is potential geographic attenuation of the impact of local medical resources.  In other 
words, this chapter looks at the degree to which proximity to medical services affects local 
patient outcomes and how quickly the impact of nearby doctors attenuates with geographic 
distance.  This is achieved by examining the impact of key features of the local medical industry 
in two concentric rings that extend out to fifty miles from the geographic centroid of a primary 
county.  Findings suggest that the medical environment in the inner ring has a notably stronger 
effect on nearby population health outcomes, as is consistent with the geographic attention of the 
impact of nearby doctors.   
The second feature is the possible presence of state border effects that may impede the 
entry of out-of-state doctors to practice in-state and therefore reduce the impact of out-of-state 
doctors on nearby patient outcomes.  The identification of the state border effect is then achieved 
by comparing the influence of doctors just on either side of a state border, controlling for 
distance.  Results indicate that the impact of out-of-state doctors is smaller than that of the in-
state doctors.  Moreover, the lesser impact of out-of-state doctors is further lessened for states 
with more stringent licensing policies that restrict the entry of out-of-state physicians.  Based on 
the evidence, I argue that the in-state versus out-of-state difference is attributable, at least in part, 
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to state-specific medical licensing regulations that impede the ability of physicians to practice 
across state lines and thereby reduce the impact of out-of-state doctors on nearby patient 
outcomes.   
Chapter 3 further explores whether the increase in productivity in agglomerated areas 
arise from the ability of sharing valuable intermediate medical input providers.  This is achieved 
by examining whether hospitals in more agglomerated locations are more likely to outsource for 
intermediate medical services, such as clinical lab services, blood bank services, etc.  These 
questions are important because they help to shed light on whether external economies of scale 
help to explain geographic variation in access to medical services and if so, whether intermediate 
input sharing is one of the channels through which it might take place.  Controlling for possible 
sample selection, I find, as expected, that hospitals in more concentrated locations are more 
likely to outsource for intermediate medical services as opposed to providing these services in-
house.  From this, I argue that agglomeration economies exist in the hospital service industry and 
are generated in part through the sharing of intermediate inputs. 
Aside from this focus, the chapter also explores the influence of the local industrial 
organization on the potential for input sharing and related external economies of scale in the 
hospital service industry.  Chinitz (1961) suggested that “large firms are … less of a stimulus to 
the creation of a community of independent suppliers.”  Similar arguments have been made by 
Jacobs (1969), Piore and Sabel (1984), and Saxenian (1994).  By focusing on firms’ entry 
decisions, Rosenthal and Strange (2010) found that small firms play an important role in the 
generation of agglomeration economies.  Glaeser, Kerr, and Ponzetto (2010) documented that 
small firms have a stronger connection with subsequent employment growth than large 
establishments, which is consistent with Chinitz’s view.  This chapter also examines this 
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organization-agglomeration relationship but from a different perspective.  Specifically, I consider 
whether the “Chinitz” effect, as captured by the percentage of small hospitals in a county, 
contributes to local hospitals’ decisions to outsource for intermediate services.  Evidence 
suggests that hospitals in areas with a higher percentage of small hospitals are more likely to 
outsource for intermediate medical services.  This implies that small hospitals help to form a 
more vibrant community, which is more attractive to specialized intermediate input providers 
and is more likely to encourage vertical disintegration.   
Chapter 4 explores the other dimension of the urban/real estate environment.  The idea is 
that, if agglomeration economies help to promote productivity in urbanized areas, the willingness 
to pay for local real estate properties will increase accordingly.  Due to potential spillover effects, 
housing prices in nearby locations may be highly correlated and contribute to a spatial error 
component.  As an initial effort to explore the spatial component of the housing market, this 
chapter replicates and extends a recent study by Holly, Pesaran, and Yamagata that was published 
in the Journal of Econometrics in 2010. Their paper applies the common correlated effects (CCE) 
estimator of Pesaran (2006) to show that state-level real housing prices are driven by economic 
fundamentals, such as real per capita disposable income, as well as by common shock, such as 
changes in interest rates, oil prices, and technological change.  This chapter replicates their 
results using the same method, which takes into account spatial interactions that reflect both 
geographical proximity and unobserved common factors, but apply the method on a different 
panel data – a panel of 384 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), as oppose to the 49 states as 
used in their paper, and our panel is observed over the period of 1975 to 2010, instead of 1975 to 
2003.  Our replication shows that their results are fairly robust to the more geographically refined 
cross-section units, and to the updated period of study.
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Chapter 2  The Influence of State Policy and Proximity to Medical Services on Health 
Outcomes 
2.1 Introduction 
Mortality rates for heart disease, cancer, and stroke differ dramatically across locations in 
the United States.  As shown in Figures 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3, mortality rates associated with these 
diseases are generally the highest in certain eastern rural states, such as West Virginia, Alabama, 
Mississippi, and the lowest in states like Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico.  Traditional 
explanations for geographic variation in health outcomes have mainly focused on the impact of 
health care expenditures and environmental factors.1  This chapter extends the literature by 
examining the effect of proximity to medical professionals on local population health outcomes 
and the degree to which state physician licensing policies reduce the impact of out-of-state 
physicians.  A better understanding of these factors is important for improving national health 
since restricted access to medical services is one of the leading causes for poor health outcomes 
in lightly developed areas.2 
The focus on proximity to medical professionals in explaining local health status is 
motivated by sharp urban-rural differences in patient outcomes.3  Using data from the 
Compressed Mortality File (CMF), Table 2-1 reports mortality rates from heart disease, cancer, 
and stroke for areas with different degrees of urbanization.  As shown in the table, mortality rates 
are significantly lower in large cities relative to small cities or remote “non-core” areas.  For 
instance, while the mortality rate for heart disease is as low as 214 per 100,000 residents for large 
                                                 
1 Previous studies examining the impact of health care expenditures find inconsistent evidence.  Studies using available cross-
sectional datasets show almost complete absence of a positive relationship between expenditures and the quality of care (Fisher et 
al., 2003a, 2003b; Baicker and Chandra, 2004; Fisher et al. 2009).  In contrast, instrumental variables and panel data evidence 
suggest that higher spending is associated with significantly lower mortality (McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse, 1994; Cutler, 
2007; Chandra and Staiger, 2007; Doyle, 2011).  
2 See, for example, Casey, et al (2001), and Coughlin, et al (2002).   
3 In the United States, residents in rural areas generally have poorer health than those in more urbanized areas.  See, for example, 
Eberhardt and Pamuk (2004), Eberhardt and Ingram (2001), and Ricketts (1999). 
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metropolitan areas, it rises up to 248 per 100,000 residents for “non-core” areas.  Similar patterns 
can also be found for cancer and stroke.   
One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that larger metropolitan areas provide 
residents with better access to medical services.  This is suggested by Table 2-2, which shows 
that medical services, as measured by the number of doctors per capita, are highly concentrated 
in large cities.  For instance, more than 100 cardiologists per ten million residents are present in 
large metropolitan areas, but only 28 are present per ten million residents in lightly developed 
“non-core” areas.  This, together with Table 2-1, further suggests that better access to medical 
professionals likely contributes to lower mortality rates from heart disease, cancer and stroke.  
A second factor that may also help to explain lower mortality rates in large cities is that 
doctors may be more productive in urban areas populated with large numbers of medical 
professionals.  This would be consistent with literature on agglomeration economies, which has 
provided evidence that productivity is often enhanced when companies operate in agglomerated 
locations. 4  The increase in productivity is thought to arise from a combination of learning from 
nearby workers and firms (i.e., knowledge spillovers), sharing of valuable intermediate input 
providers (i.e., input sharing), and/or opportunities to draw upon skilled pools of nearby labor 
(i.e., labor market pooling).5  
Both explanations suggest that the impact of doctors on local patient outcomes will 
diminish with distance.  High travel costs associated with long distances impede access to nearby 
                                                 
4 This idea is introduced in Marshall (1920) and surveyed extensively in later literature (Quigley, 1998; Rosenthal and Strange, 
2004; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). 
5 See, for instance, Glaeser and Maré (2001), and Moretti (2004) for evidence of knowledge spillovers, Holmes (1999), Ellison, 
Glaeser, and Kerr (2010), and Li (2012) for evidence of input sharing, and Rosenthal and Strange (2001), and Costa and Kahn 
(2000) for evidence of labor market pooling. 
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medical services.  Potential spillover effects that may enhance physician productivities in treating 
patients also tend to attenuate with distance, as suggested in the literature.6   
The first goal of this chapter is to examine the extent to which proximity to medical 
services affects local patient outcomes and how quickly the impact of nearby doctors attenuates 
with geographic distance.  To this end, I examine the impact of key features of the local medical 
industry (e.g., the number of physicians) in two concentric rings that extend out to fifty miles 
from the geographic centroid of a primary county.7  As will become apparent, the medical 
environment in the inner ring has a notably stronger effect on nearby population health 
outcomes. 
A second goal of the paper is to identify the possible presence of state border effects that 
may impede the ability of physicians to practice across state lines and thereby reduce the impact 
of out-of-state physicians on nearby patient outcomes.  Such effects may arise because of state-
specific medical licensing regulations and related policies that govern reciprocity of physician 
licensing across state boundaries.8  By comparing the influence of doctors just on either side of a 
state border, I show that the impact of out-of-state doctors on nearby patient outcomes is smaller 
than that of in-state doctors.  The in-state versus out-of-state difference is attributable, at least in 
part, to state physician licensing laws: results indicate that the lesser impact of out-of-state 
doctors is amplified for states with more stringent licensing policies.  
As an alternative approach, I also experiment with measures of the per capita number of 
physicians in a state and the number of physicians per square mile in a state as indicators of the 
statewide medical policy environment.  These measures are motivated by reports that rural states 
                                                 
6 See, Rosenthal and Strange (2003, 2005, 2008), Andersson, Quigley, and Wilhelmsson (2009), and Arzaghi and Henderson 
(2008). 
7 As a comparison, the median of county area in the United States is 645.18 square miles, which corresponds to a circle with a 
14.33-mile radius; the seventy-fifth percentile is 973.41 square miles, which corresponds to a circle with a 17.61-mile radius. 
8 Data source: State Medical Licensure Requirements and Statistics, American Medical Association.  Details of this policy will be 
provided in Section 2.2. 
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are more proactive in trying to attract medical professionals to their locations.9  Evidence from 
this alternative approach is similar to when a direct measure of the policy environment is used in 
the model specification. 
My findings in this chapter contribute to two distinct but important literatures.  The first 
is the health economics literature.   By examining the influence of state medical licensing policy 
and proximity to medical services on local patient outcomes, I offer a new perspective on 
geographic variation in health outcomes.   Evidence of state border effects also points to 
inefficiencies in the health care system and, in this sense, yields important policy implications for 
state reciprocity agreements.  This is particularly important in the context of rising health care 
expenditures.10   
This chapter also contributes to literature on the presence and nature of agglomeration 
economies.  The evidence of a state border effect helps to identify the underlying micro-
foundations of agglomeration economies, and more precisely in this case, the role of labor 
market pooling.  Identification of this micro-foundation has proven especially challenging in the 
agglomeration literature.11  The strategy adopted here is to show that out-of-state physicians have 
a smaller positive impact on nearby patient outcomes, controlling for distance.  I argue that this 
is consistent with the idea that access to pools of skilled labor enhances productivity and, hence, 
supports labor market pooling as an important microfoundation and driver of agglomeration 
economies.12 
                                                 
9 Texas, for instance, has invested in expanding residency opportunities beyond the number of medical students in Texas with the 
aim of attracting more out-of-state medical graduates to Texas. http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2010/11/addressing-physician-
shortage-texas.html  
10 The rise in health care expenditures over time has been documented in Chernew, Hirth, and Cutler (2003), and Bodenheimer 
(2005), for instance. 
11 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004).  
12 The idea is that, when companies face idiosyncratic market shocks, having access to a large labor market pool enhances 
productivity by being able to adjust the number of workers at a lower cost.  Similarly, when hospitals experience temporal 
increase in demand for doctors, the presence of nearby medical professionals helps to increase productivity in treating patients by 
providing immediate pools of labor to draw upon.  
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The empirical work to follow is based on two datasets at the county level: the 
Compressed Mortality File (CMF) and the Area Resource File (ARF).13  Separate regressions are 
carried out for three types of diseases: heart disease, cancer, and stroke.  Mortality rates 
associated with these diseases at the county level are obtained from the CMF and are used as 
proxies for health outcomes.  A wide set of medical factors are extracted from the ARF and are 
converted into concentric ring variables and further partial concentric rings based on how the 
rings are intersected by state lines.  This specification improves upon previous studies by 
including a richer palette of explanatory variables that capture the distribution of local medical 
services. 
I obtain three key results.  First, the impact of nearby medical professionals on local 
population health outcomes attenuates with geographic distance.  For example, focusing on 
doctors residing inside the state, a ten percent increase in doctors within 25 miles reduces the 
mortality rate for heart disease in a county by 0.626 percent.  This effect drops to 0.046 percent 
for doctors within the 25-50 mile distance band.  Similar attenuation patterns can also be found 
for adjacent out-of-state doctors, as well as for other types of diseases considered in this chapter.  
Second, in-state doctors contribute more to lowering mortality rates in the primary county than 
do out-of-state doctors.  Focusing only on the 25-mile ring, a ten percent increase in doctors 
inside the state reduces the mortality rate for stroke by 0.882 percent, which is 0.375 higher in 
percentage points than the corresponding out-of-state effect.  Third, the smaller impact of out-of-
state doctors is further amplified if the physician licensing policy adopted by the primary state is 
more likely to restrict entry of out-of-state physicians.  The results are robust when the statewide 
medical policy environment is further instrumented by per-capita number of doctors and number 
of doctors per square mile.  The evidence also suggests that access to pools of skilled labor 
                                                 
13 Details regarding these two data files are provided in Section 2.4. 
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enhances productivity, which is consistent with labor market pooling as one of the specific 
channels through which agglomeration economies affect productivity. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 discusses state-specific medical 
licensing policies that restrict out-of-state doctors from practicing in-state.  Section 2.3 presents 
the empirical framework.  Section 2.4 describes data and variables.  Section 2.5 shows the 
empirical results, highlighting the impact of proximity to medical services, the influence of state 
borders, and the role of state-specific licensing policies in the imposition of barriers for out-of-
state doctors to practice across state lines.  Finally, section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 State-Specific Medical Licensing Policies 
Each state in the United States has its own board of medicine that licenses and regulates 
the practice of state physicians.  Over time, various licensing boards have developed distinctive 
laws and regulations to ensure the health, safety and welfare of their citizens.  The variation in 
medical regulations and a lack of universal reciprocity between states impose barriers for 
physicians who are currently holding an active license in one jurisdiction to practice in another.  
In particular, a physician who is intent on providing patient care in another state is required to go 
through a complicated application process in order to obtain a fully unrestricted medical license 
from this state.14   
The application process is referred to as the licensure endorsement.  It is generally based 
on documentation of successfully completing approved examinations, authentication of required 
core documents, and completion of any additional requirements assessing the applicant’s fitness 
to practice medicine in the new jurisdiction.  The level of standard requires efforts that are 
viewed as duplicative and time-consuming.  For example, applicants may be asked to participate 
                                                 
14 Details can be found in State Medical Licensure Requirements and Statistics, American Medical Association. 
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in extensive interviews or, in other instances, to retake and pass current licensing exams if it has 
been more than a certain number of years since the applicant passed the then-current exam.  
There can be considerable expenses in terms of time and cost associated with preparing 
interviews or taking exams, particularly for specialists who have limited the scope of their 
practice for a certain period of time.   
There are sizable variations in specific requirements of endorsement policies from one 
state to another.  Differences are shown in three main aspects: application fees for licensure 
endorsement, interview requirements and maximum years since passing board examination.15   
Taking year 2007 as an example and as shown in Table 2-3, thirty-four states require candidates 
applying for licensure endorsement to show up for a comprehensive interview; eleven states 
stipulate that a license can only be endorsed within a certain number of years after the applicant 
passed his/her most recent medical board examination.  Among the eleven states with maximum 
years constraint, Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Texas require doctors to refresh their exam records if it has been more than 10 
years since they initially took the exam.  The other three states (Idaho, Oregon, and Maryland) 
have similar but slightly different requirements regarding when exam records expire for 
endorsement (5, 7, and 15 years, respectively).  State variation in interview requirements and 
maximum years constraints is relatively consistent over time. 
I define a state as having “stringent policies” if it restricts entry of out-of-state physicians 
by adopting either the interview requirement or the maximum years constraint.  I differentiate 
neither the different extent of maximum years constraint nor its influence compared to that of a 
                                                 
15 Maximum years since passing board examination refer to the maximum number of years it takes for an out-of-state doctor’s 
exam record to expire for endorsement application to practice in a particular state. 
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comprehensive interview. 16  Out of forty-nine states in the continental United States, thirty-six 
are classified as those with more demanding application procedures for licensure endorsement.17   
2.3 Empirical Framework 
This section describes the framework that motivates the empirical analysis to follow.  The 
modeling approach is built upon the literature on agglomeration economies.  Numerous studies 
have provided evidence that external economies of scale enhance productivity in the 
manufacturing sector.18  The existence of similar spillover effects in the health care industry has 
been explored in a few recent studies.  These studies find significant localization effects: when 
the scale of local health care industry is large, patient outcomes improve (Baicker and Chandra, 
2010) and local hospitals are more likely to outsource intermediate medical services (Li, 2012) 
and run at a lower cost (Cohen and Pall, 2008).19 
To illustrate the idea of spatial attenuation and state border effect, as highlighted earlier in 
the paper, I begin by assuming that the county-level health production function follows a Cobb-
Douglas functional form.  That is, 
 log log log log . (3.1)
To capture the geographic attenuation of spillover effects, all the key features of local 
medical industry (e.g., number of doctors, nurses and hospital beds) are specified as concentric 
rings that extend out to fifty miles around the geographic centroid of the primary county.20  To 
                                                 
16 Physician Licensure: An Update of Trends. American Medical Association.  
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/member-groups-sections/young-physicians-section/advocacy-
resources/physician-licensure-an-update-trends.page 
17 States with stringent medical licensing policies based on this definition are highlighted in bold in Table 3-3. 
18 To name a few, see Holmes (1999), Rosenthal and Strange (2001), and Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2010). 
19 As established in the literature, agglomeration economies pertain to external economies of scale and are often divided into two 
types.  Those that respect industry boundaries are often referred to as localization economies.  Those that extend beyond industry 
boundaries and focus, instead, on the scale associated with city size are referred to as urbanization economies. 
20 To strike a balance between maintaining sufficient power to reliably estimate the model while also retaining as much precision 
as possible, I specify two distance bands: 0 to 25 miles and 25 to 50 miles.  This specification is based on the assumption that 25 
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capture the difference in the extent of spillovers associated with in-state and out-of-state medical 
services, each concentric ring variable is further divided into the portion belonging to the same 
state and the portion overlapping the neighboring states.  This specification helps to capture state 
border effects, while also allowing for geographic attenuation.21  
The estimation equation is, thus, specified as follows, 
 log   
 
   log log log   
 
        	 log log log   
 
        	 log log log   
 
        	 log log log   
         	 . (3.2)
In this expression, the superscript 0 25 indicates that the corresponding variables are 
defined for the 25-mile ring and 25 50 represents variables associated with the 25-50 mile 
concentric ring.  The subscript    stands for county    in state , while the subscript    
denotes the portion of the concentric ring formed around the centroid of county  	 but 
overlapping the neighboring states.    is a vector of county-level demographic controls.   
captures the state fixed effect. 
                                                                                                                                                             
miles are close to the maximum commuting distance for medical practitioners who must be able to travel to the hospital quickly 
given long work hours and periodic emergencies. 
21 The above idea is captured graphically in Figure 2-4.  The horizontal axis denotes locations.  The centered solid line points to 
the location of the primary county’s geographic centroid.  The vertical axis represents the magnitude of the spillover effect from 
doctors located at various distances from the centroid of the primary county.  As illustrated by the dashed line, the impact of 
nearby doctors is expected to attenuate gradually with distance, drop discretely at state boundaries, and continue with its 
attenuation pattern afterwards.     
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The identification of state border effects relies on the assumption that the specified 
concentric rings are sufficient to capture the attenuation gradient.  In other words, the impact of 
doctors associated with each distance band is assumed to be fairly homogenous.  However, if the 
attenuation of spillover effects is more spatially continuous, the difference between  and  
should be better interpreted as a mix of the attenuation and the state border effect.  This is 
because the in-state 25-mile partial ring captures medical inputs that are distributed closer to the 
centroid of the primary county, while the corresponding out-of-state measure tends to capture 
inputs distributed further away.   
I address this issue by exploring exogenous variation in stringency of state medical 
licensing policies, as discussed extensively in Section 2.  Specifically, a dummy variable 
indicating whether a state adopts more stringent licensing policies is interacted with out-of-state 
doctor measures.  If state borders impede access to nearby medical services due to state-specific 
licensing laws, the lesser impact of out-of-state doctors should be amplified for states with more 
stringent policies, which will be captured by the coefficient of the interaction term.  The 
identification assumption is that the adoption of more stringent endorsement policies is not 
correlated with unobserved factors that may also influence health outcomes. 
2.4 Data and Variables 
The empirical analysis is based on two primary data sources.  The first is the Compressed 
Mortality File (CMF), from which I obtain county-level mortality rates for the three most life-
threatening diseases: heart disease, cancer, and stroke. 22  Mortality rates associated with each 
type of disease in a county are calculated as the number of deaths from the disease between 1999 
                                                 
22 The ranking for causes of death can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lcod.htm. 
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and 2007 divided by the standard population reported in 2000 decennial census.23  Heart disease 
is defined by the ICD-10 codes ranging from GR113-055 to GR113-068, cancer is defined as 
GR113-020 to GR113-036, and stroke is defined by GR113-070.24 
The second data source is the Area Resource File (ARF) which is published by the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).  This file provides the numbers of doctors, 
nurses and hospital beds at the county level.  For measures of doctor capacity, I focus particularly 
on the numbers of cardiologists, oncologists, and neurologists corresponding to heart disease, 
cancer and stroke considered in this chapter.  This helps to capture the impact of the most 
relevant medical professionals.  These variables, together with the numbers of nurses and 
hospital beds, are further converted into partial concentric ring variables using Geographic 
Information System (GIS) software (MapInfo and MapBasic, in this instance).     
Several steps are taken to form the concentric ring variables.  First, circles of radius 25 
and 50 miles are drawn around the geographic centroid of each county.  Second, treating doctors 
(nurses, or hospital beds) within a given county as uniformly distributed throughout the area, the 
number of doctors (nurses, or hospital beds) contained in a given created circle is calculated by 
constructing a proportional sum of the measure associated with each portion of the county 
intersected by the given circle.25  Third, doctors (nurses, or hospital beds) in adjacent circles are 
differentiated to obtain the corresponding measure within the corresponding concentric ring.  
Finally, the number of doctors (nurses, or hospital beds) within a given concentric ring is further 
                                                 
23 Compressed Mortality File 1999-2007 can be accessed through CDC WONDER On-line Database: http://wonder.cdc.gov/cmf-
icd10.htm.  The data file is compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. 
24 The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10) is a coding of 
diseases, signs and symptoms, abnormal findings, complaints, social circumstances and external causes of injury or diseases, as 
classified by the World Health Organization (WHO). 
25 The construction of the proportional sum measure is better presented in Figure 2-5.  For example, for county A, a 25-mile circle 
around its centroid intersects seven neighboring counties.  The number of doctors (nurses, or hospital beds) within the circle is 
calculated as the sum of the doctors (nurses, or hospital beds) belonging to each shaded portion of counties (including A itself) 
that overlap the circle, assuming doctors (nurses, or hospital beds) are uniformly distributed throughout the area.  
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decomposed into the portion that belongs to the primary state and the portion overlapping the 
neighboring states.   
To further control for environmental factors that may also influence patient outcomes, I 
extract a set of standard demographic variables from the ARF.  These include the percentage of 
uninsured population, the percentage of residents greater than 65 years old, per capita income, 
the percentage of people in poverty, the percentage of Black inhabitants, the percentage of Asian 
inhabitants, the percentage of Hispanic inhabitants, and the percentage of people with lower than 
high school education.  In addition, in all of the models that I adopt later, state fixed effects are 
included to capture unobserved differences across states.   
Table 2-4 provides summary statistics of each variable that enters the estimation 
equation.  The average mortality rate for heart disease is 0.29 %, highest among all three.  The 
average mortality rates for cancer and stroke are 0.18 % and 0.07 %, respectively.  Means and 
standard deviations are also reported for doctors per bed, nurses per bed, and hospital beds as 
partial concentric rings measured separately for the in-state portion and the out-of-state portion.26          
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 How quickly does the impact of doctors attenuate? 
This section reports estimates on the degree to which proximity to medical services 
affects patient outcomes.  Table 2-5 shows results when mortality rates are used directly as 
proxies for patient outcomes (log mortality rates as dependent variables), while Table 2-6 reports 
estimates when patient outcomes are represented as an exponential function of the quality 
indicators (mortality rates as dependent variables).  The following discussion will focus on Table 
2-5, but similar results can also be found in Table 2-6. 
                                                 
26 All the medical input variables are inflated by one in order to avoid zeros that render invalidity when constructing the key 
regressors as fractions in log terms. 
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In Table 2-5, estimates are reported separately for heart disease, cancer, and stroke.  For 
each type of disease, I first run OLS regressions with only 25-mile rings for the medical 
establishment controls.  I then add 25-50 mile rings to capture possible attenuation effects.  The 
estimated coefficient associated with the closer distance band is both higher in magnitude and 
more significant.  Focusing only on the in-state portion and taking heart disease as an example, 
the estimated elasticity of cardiologists within 25 miles is 0.0626 (the absolute value of the 
estimated coefficient in 1st row, 2nd column).  This effect is much stronger than cardiologists 
present in the 25-50 mile concentric ring (0.0046 in 3rd row, 2nd column).  Similar patterns also 
show up for the estimated elasticities associated with nurse measures.27  For other types of 
diseases, the estimated elasticities of the 25-mile ring measures are generally of higher 
magnitude than those corresponding to the 25-50 mile concentric rings.28   
Generally speaking, the evidence reported in Table 2-5 and Table 2-6 is consistent with 
spatial attenuation of the influence of medical services on nearby patient outcomes.  Medical 
professionals within 25 miles have a notably higher effect on the primary county’s health status, 
whereas the effects of doctors and nurses beyond this range are not significant in terms of 
reducing the primary county’s mortality rates for heart disease, cancer, and stroke.  
2.5.2 Is there a state border effect? 
In addition to spatial attenuation, estimates reported in Table 2-5 and Table 2-6 also help 
to explain whether state borders impede access to nearby medical services.  As shown in both 
tables, the in-state doctor effect is generally of higher magnitude and more significant compared 
to the corresponding out-of-state doctor effect.  This is especially so when focusing on the 25-
                                                 
27 The estimated positive impact of nurses on population health outcomes is consistent with findings in Gruber and Kleiner 
(2012) which show that nurse strikes tend to impose a negative influence on patient outcomes in New York State. 
28 I am cautious about comparing estimated elasticities associated with the out-of-state portion of each concentric ring variable 
since the identification solely relies on a small portion of the sample. Partly for this reason, the out-of-state portion estimates tend 
to be insignificant. 
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mile distance band.  For instance, in Table 2-5, the estimated elasticities associated with in-state 
and out-of-state neurologists within 25 miles are 0.0892 and 0.0396, respectively, and are both 
significantly identified (1st and 2nd rows, 6th column).  The magnitude of the estimated coefficient 
for the in-state portion is 0.0496 higher than that for the out-of-state portion.  This pattern is 
generally consistent for all three types of diseases and is robust to how the health outcome is 
measured, although in some instances the out-of-state elasticities tend to be imprecisely 
estimated.29   
Although evidence presented in both tables is generally consistent and robust, I am still 
cautious with interpretation of the state border effect.  As discussed earlier, to argue that the in-
state versus out-of-state difference is due to the influence of state borders, I implicitly assume 
that the attenuation gradient is properly controlled for.  If the attenuation tends to be more 
spatially continuous, in-state doctors are considered as distributed closer to the centroid of the 
primary county.  In this way, the difference in the in-state versus out-of-state estimates associated 
with each distance band should be better treated as a mix of both the attenuation effect and the 
state border effect.   
In order to identify the state border effect in a more convincing way, I exploit exogenous 
variation in stringency of state-specific medical licensing policies to examine whether the lesser 
impact of out-of-state doctors is amplified for states with stricter policies.  This is accomplished 
by interacting a dummy variable for states adopting stricter licensing policies with controls for 
the number of out-of-state doctor per bed within 25 miles.30  As shown in the first three columns 
of Table 2-9, the estimated coefficient associated with the interaction term for the three types of 
                                                 
29 The evidence for neurologists within 25-50 miles distance band seems counter-intuitive.  For now, I don’t have a good 
explanation of it. 
30 Only 25-mile rings are included in this specification since the effects of various medical inputs beyond this range are generally 
insignificant as demonstrated in Table 2-5 and Table 2-6. 
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diseases is generally positive and significant.31  This suggests that patient outcomes in states with 
stricter licensing policies are less likely to be affected by the presence of nearby out-of-state 
doctors.  These findings provide further evidence for the impact of state borders.  
As additional robustness checks, I also experiment with two other ways of instrumenting 
the stringency of state medical policy environment.  The first is to use statewide per capita 
number of doctors, while the second is to use the number of doctors per square mile.  These 
instruments are motivated by broad recognition that there are fewer doctors in rural areas and 
that rural areas tend to be more proactive in trying to attract physicians.  In this sense, it is the 
rural nature of the state, as captured by per capita number of doctors and doctors per square mile, 
that is driving related policies that govern reciprocity of physician licensing across state lines.   
Table 2-7 and Table 2-8 show the rankings of states by per capita number of doctors and 
number of doctors per square mile.   States with index values above the median are classified as 
being more likely to restrict entry of out-of-state physicians, whereas the rest are assumed to be 
less likely to do so.  A similar dummy variable as a proxy for policy stringency is created based 
on the above definition and is interacted with the out-of-state measure of medical professionals.  
Corresponding results are reported between column 4 and column 9 in Table 2-9.  As shown in 
the table, the estimated coefficients for the interaction term are generally positive and significant.  
This evidence is consistent with the idea that the impact of out-of-state doctors on nearby patient 
outcomes is higher for rural states that are more proactive in attracting out-of-state physicians.  
The general pattern is consistent for all three types of diseases considered in this chapter. 
The identification of state border effects shows that out-of-state physicians have a less 
positive impact on nearby patient outcomes.  Given that knowledge spillovers are unlikely to be 
                                                 
31 Estimated results obtained when mortality rates are used as the dependent variables are reported in the Appendix.  Estimates 
are robust to how patient outcomes are measured.  
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impeded by state boundaries, the smaller impact of out-of-state doctors provides support for the 
idea that access to pools of skilled labor enhances productivity. 32   As with findings in Rosenthal 
and Strange (2001) and Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2010), this is consistent with labor market 
pooling as an important microfoundation of agglomeration economies. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides evidence that spatial concentration of medical services improves 
local population health outcomes and the influence tends to attenuate with geographic distance.  
Estimates suggest that a ten percent increase in the number of doctors that are present within 25 
miles of the primary county reduces mortality rates from heart disease, cancer, and stroke by 
0.660, 0.533, and 0.882 percent, respectively.  The impact of doctors further away tends to be 
insignificant and smaller in magnitude. 
A second result is that state-specific licensing policies that restrict out-of-state doctors 
from practicing across state boundaries impede patient access to nearby out-of-state physicians 
and, thereby, reduce the health outcome of residents living in border areas.  The smaller impact 
of out-of-state doctors is further amplified when the primary state adopts more stringent 
physician licensing policies.  Two other ways of capturing the border effect, by drawing on state 
variation in per capita number of doctors and number of doctors per square mile, yield consistent 
results.  The latter is based on the argument that rural states that face shortages of medical 
professionals tend to design policies in a way that is more attractive to out-of-state doctors.   
As a further perspective, the evidence of state border effect suggests that restrictions on 
access to pools of skilled medical professionals reduce the beneficial effect of doctors on nearby 
                                                 
32 The policy prohibits long-term medical practice of out-of-state doctors without licensure endorsement, but allows for temporal 
out-of-state medical consultation.  The latter facilitates unrestricted knowledge exchanges.  I also experiment with including 
medical laboratories on either side of the border as proxies for medical inputs, but the signal tends to be weak due to proliferation 
of highly correlated controls. 
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patient outcomes.  This evidence is consistent with labor market pooling as a specific channel 
through which spillover effects might occur. 
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Table 2-1: Mortality Rates (per 100,000 Residents) Stratified by Urbanization Level 
Urbanization Level a Heart Disease Cancer Stroke 
Large Metro b 214.1 138.8 46.2 
Medium Metro c 219.0 147.6 52.6 
Small Metro d 225.5 152.1 56.0 
Micropolitan (Adjacent to Metro) e 240.4 155.1 56.7 
Noncore f 247.6 156.9 57.6 
a National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) has developed an urban-rural classification scheme for U.S. counties and county-
equivalents.  The classification scheme is based on 2003 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes and 2003 Urban Influence Codes 
released by Economic Research Service (ERS).   
b Large Metro areas contain counties in metro area of at least 1 million residents or more. 
c Medium Metro areas contain counties in metro area of 250,000-999,999 population. 
d Small Metro areas contain counties in metro area of 50,000-249,999 population. 
e Micropolitan areas contain counties with urban population of 20,000-49,999 (adjacent to metro area). 
f Noncore areas contain counties with urban population of 20,000-49,999 (not adjacent to metro area) and counties with 
population below 20,000. 
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Table 2-2: Number of Doctors per 100,000 Residents Stratified by Urbanization Level 
Urbanization Level a Doctors  Cardiologists Oncologists Neurologists 
Large Metro b 40.63 1.01 0.68 0.19 
Medium Metro c 33.93 0.84 0.50 0.18 
Small Metro d 32.43 0.84 0.53 0.19 
Micropolitan (Adjacent to Metro) e 12.81 0.23 0.14 0.05 
Noncore f 20.86 0.28 0.19 0.07 
a National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) has developed an urban-rural classification scheme for U.S. counties and county-
equivalents.  The classification scheme is based on 2003 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes and 2003 Urban Influence Codes 
released by Economic Research Service (ERS).   
b Large Metro areas contain counties in metro area of at least 1 million residents or more. 
c Medium Metro areas contain counties in metro area of 250,000-999,999 population. 
d Small Metro areas contain counties in metro area of 50,000-249,999 population. 
e Micropolitan areas contain counties with urban population of 20,000-49,999 (adjacent to metro area). 
f Noncore areas contain counties with urban population of 20,000-49,999 (not adjacent to metro area) and counties with 
population below 20,000. 
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Table 2-3: State-Specific Medical Licensing Policies in 2007 
State 
Medical License 
Application Fee 
($) 
Interview 
Requirements a 
Maximum Years 
Since Passing 
Board Exam b State 
Medical License 
Application Fee 
($) 
Interview 
Requirements a 
Maximum Years 
Since Passing 
Board Exam b 
Alabama 175 NO 10 Nebraska 202 NO - 
Arizona 500 YES 10 Nevada 600 YES - 
Arkansas 400 NO - New Hampshire 250 NO - 
California 1295 NO - New Jersey 225 YES - 
Colorado 425 NO - New Mexico 400 YES - 
Connecticut 450 NO - New York 735 NO - 
Delaware 301 YES - North Carolina 350 YES 10 
Washington D.C. 305 NO - North Dakota 200 YES - 
Florida 500 YES - Ohio 335 NO - 
Georgia 400 YES - Oklahoma 400 YES - 
Idaho 400 YES 5 Oregon 375 YES 7 
Illinois 300 YES - Pennsylvania 20 NO - 
Indiana 250 YES - Rhode Island 570 YES - 
Iowa 505 YES - South Carolina 600 YES 10 
Kansas 300 YES - South Dakota 200 YES - 
Kentucky 300 NO - Tennessee 235 YES - 
Louisiana 382 YES 10 Texas 885 YES 10 
Maine 450 YES - Utah 200 YES - 
Maryland 822 NO 15 Vermont 600 YES - 
Massachusetts 600 YES - Virginia 302 YES - 
Michigan 150 NO - Washington 425 NO - 
Minnesota 200 YES 10 West Virginia 300 YES - 
Mississippi 600 YES 10 Wisconsin 110 YES - 
Missouri 300 YES - Wyoming 600 YES - 
Montana 325 YES -     
a Interview requirements refer to the fact that physicians are required to participate in comprehensive interviews in order to obtain another fully unrestricted license from the target 
state board of medicine. 
b Maximum years since passing board exam stipulate how long it takes for an out-of-state doctor’s exam record to expire for endorsement to practice in the target state. 
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Table 2-4: Summary Statistics 
 mean std. dev. min max 
Mortality rate of heart disease (%) 0.2886 0.0924 0.0281 0.7649 
Mortality rate of cancer (%) 0.1797 0.0444 0.0169 0.3396 
Mortality rate of stroke (%) 0.0689 0.0256 0.0035 0.2372 
Log (# of cardiologists per bed)_0-25_in-state -4.0550 0.7690 -6.8373 0.0000 
Log (# of cardiologists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -1.1538 1.6738 -6.4263 0.7433 
Log (# of cardiologists per bed)_25-50_in-state -4.2377 0.6451 -7.1134 0.0000 
Log (# of cardiologists per bed)_25-50_out-of-state -2.4164 1.9906 -6.2631 0.3980 
Log (# of oncologists per bed)_0-25_in-state -4.8715 0.9245 -7.0113 0.0000 
Log (# of oncologists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -1.3369 1.9745 -6.6008 0.6262 
Log (# of oncologists per bed)_25-50_in-state -5.3450 0.6191 -7.3046 0.0000 
Log (# of oncologists per bed)_25-50_out-of-state -2.9279 2.4426 -7.1263 0.1919 
Log (# of neurologists per bed)_0-25_in-state -4.3627 0.8218 -6.6455 0.0000 
Log (# of neurologists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -1.2306 1.7951 -6.4344 0.3118 
Log (# of neurologists per bed)_25-50_in-state -4.6198 0.6480 -6.8180 0.0000 
Log (# of neurologists per bed)_25-50_out-of-state -2.6133 2.1643 -6.6801 0.0000 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_in-state 0.0530 0.4267 -2.7535 1.4299 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_out-of-state 0.0099 0.2709 -1.9194 1.2620 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_25-50_in-state 0.1166 0.3424 -1.3950 0.9828 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_25-50_out-of-state 0.0321 0.3277 -1.7804 1.4345 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_in-state 5.7471 1.5236 0.0000 10.5712 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_out-of-state 1.4868 2.2910 0.0000 10.4414 
Log (# of hospital beds)_25-50_in-state 6.8705 1.2969 0.0000 10.3956 
Log (# of hospital beds)_25-50_out-of-state 3.4818 3.0747 0.0000 10.6523 
% Black 8.8421 14.5663 0.0000 86.5000 
% Asian 1.0589 1.9529 0.0000 31.6715 
% Hispanic 6.2075 12.0488 0.1000 97.5000 
% of Uninsured 20.6792 6.6926 7.9000 50.6000 
% of > 65 years old 37.3756 3.9667 20.6000 54.3000 
Per capita income 30347.01 8127.01 8579.00 132728.00 
%  in poverty 15.1210 6.2421 2.4000 55.9000 
% of < high school 9.1094 5.2538 0.0000 46.3000 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.8521 1.6919 1.5000 18.0000 
a Sample contains 3,108 observations in total. 
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Table 2-5: Attenuation and State Border Effects a 
Dependent Variable: Log Mortality Rates of Various Diseases (%)  
 Heart Disease Cancer Stroke 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0660*** -0.0626*** -0.0533*** -0.0524*** -0.0882*** -0.0892*** 
 (-8.11) (-7.32) (-5.73) (-5.76) (-8.25) (-7.46) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0110 -0.0056 -0.0094 -0.0040 -0.0507*** -0.0396*** 
 (-1.42) (-0.71) (-1.29) (-0.54) (-4.79) (-3.67) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_25-50_in-state - -0.0046 - -0.0004 - 0.0065 
 - (-0.47) - (-0.06) - (0.51) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_25-50_out-of-state - -0.0029 - -0.0053 - -0.0214*** 
 - (-0.50) - (-1.05) - (-2.65) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0519*** -0.0402** -0.0155 -0.0157 -0.0167 -0.0042 
 (-3.55) (-2.58) (-1.18) (-1.25) (-0.87) (-0.21) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0337** -0.0245 -0.0065 -0.0057 -0.0227 -0.0150 
 (-2.41) (-1.64) (-0.64) (-0.52) (-1.08) (-0.65) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_25-50_in-state - -0.0306 - 0.0006 - -0.0469 
 - (-1.41) - (0.03) - (-1.54) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_25-50_out-of-state - -0.0213 - 0.0015 - 0.0083 
 - (-1.34) - (0.11) - (0.37) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_in-state -0.0051 -0.0025 -0.0171*** -0.0155*** -0.0168** -0.0178** 
 (-1.05) (-0.46) (-3.62) (-3.13) (-2.39) (-2.31) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0051 -0.0061 -0.0064 -0.0042 -0.0441*** -0.0347*** 
 (-0.86) (-1.03) (-0.99) (-0.65) (-5.22) (-4.05) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_25-50_in-state - -0.0020 - -0.0025 - 0.0053 
 - (-0.36) - (-0.56) - (0.71) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_25-50_out-of-state - 0.0044 - -0.0012 - -0.0134** 
 - (1.03) - (-0.27) - (-2.08) 
No. of State Fixed Effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 
No. of Observations 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,105 
R-squared 0.705 0.707 0.721 0.722 0.518 0.520 
a Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. Other control variables include % Black, % Asian, % Hispanic, % of 
uninsured, % of > 65years old, per capita income, % in poverty, % of < high school, and unemployment rate (%). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2-6: Attenuation and State Border Effects 
Dependent Variable: Mortality Rates of Various Diseases (%)  
 Heart Disease Cancer Stroke 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0174*** -0.0150*** -0.0083*** -0.0077*** -0.0059*** -0.0059*** 
 (-8.57) (-6.92) (-7.31) (-6.60) (-9.27) (-8.02) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0042** -0.0028 -0.0020* -0.0013 -0.0029*** -0.0020*** 
 (-2.15) (-1.39) (-1.88) (-1.13) (-4.63) (-3.15) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_25-50_in-state - -0.0061** - -0.0014 - 0.0002 
 - (-2.35) - (-1.28) - (0.25) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_25-50_out-of-state - -0.0011 - -0.0010 - -0.0015*** 
 - (-0.70) - (-1.26) - (-2.70) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0118*** -0.0108*** -0.0023 -0.0029 -0.0009 0.0002 
 (-3.04) (-2.70) (-1.25) (-1.55) (-0.74) (0.13) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0108*** -0.0077* -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0028* -0.0019 
 (-2.72) (-1.78) (-0.66) (-0.64) (-1.76) (-1.05) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_25-50_in-state - 0.0000 - 0.0019 - -0.0039* 
 - (0.00) - (0.76) - (-1.92) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_25-50_out-of-state - -0.0071 - 0.0007 - -0.0004 
 - (-1.59) - (0.34) - (-0.27) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_in-state -0.0030*** -0.0021 -0.0031*** -0.0027*** -0.0018*** -0.0019*** 
 (-2.68) (-1.63) (-4.70) (-3.81) (-4.32) (-4.14) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0024*** -0.0018*** 
 (-1.52) (-1.52) (-1.62) (-1.17) (-5.12) (-3.58) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_25-50_in-state - -0.0005 - -0.0007 - 0.0006 
 - (-0.34) - (-1.08) - (1.26) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_25-50_out-of-state - 0.0007 - -0.0005 - -0.0009* 
 - (0.62) - (-0.70) - (-1.93) 
No. of State Fixed Effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 
No. of Observations 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,105 
R-squared 0.684 0.687 0.743 0.744 0.478 0.481 
a Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. Other control variables include % Black, % Asian, % Hispanic, % of 
uninsured, % of > 65years old, per capita income, % in poverty, % of < high school, and unemployment rate (%). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2-7: Rank of States by Number of Doctors per Capita (Per 100,000 Residents) 
Rank State Doctors per Capita Rank State Doctors per Capita 
1 Washington D. C.  81 26 Delaware 28 
2 Massachusetts 51 27 Nebraska 27 
3 New York 44 28 North Dakota 27 
4 Maryland 43 29 New Mexico 27 
5 Vermont 43 30 Missouri 27 
6 Connecticut 41 31 Montana 26 
7 Rhode Island 41 32 Kentucky 25 
8 New Jersey 35 33 West Virginia 25 
9 Pennsylvania 34 34 South Carolina 25 
10 Minnesota 32 35 Kansas 25 
11 Maine 32 36 Indiana 24 
12 New Hampshire 31 37 South Dakota 24 
13 Oregon 31 38 Arizona 24 
14 Illinois 31 39 Alabama 24 
15 Washington 30 40 Georgia 23 
16 California 30 41 Utah 23 
17 Virginia 30 42 Texas 23 
18 Ohio 30 43 Arkansas 22 
19 Florida 29 44 Iowa 21 
20 Louisiana 29 45 Wyoming 21 
21 Colorado 29 46 Nevada 21 
22 Wisconsin 29 47 Mississippi 20 
23 Tennessee 29 48 Oklahoma 19 
24 North Carolina 28 49 Idaho 19 
25 Michigan 28    
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Table 2-8: Rank of States by Number of Doctors per Square Mile (SM) 
Rank State Doctors per SM Rank State Doctors per SM 
1 Washington D. C.  69.7688 26 Louisiana 0.2413 
2 New Jersey 3.4629 27 Missouri 0.2241 
3 Massachusetts 3.1080 28 Alabama 0.2091 
4 Rhode Island 2.7993 29 Texas 0.2037 
5 Connecticut 2.6195 30 Minnesota 0.1933 
6 Maryland 1.9689 31 West Virginia 0.1901 
7 New York 1.5432 32 Colorado 0.1338 
8 Delaware 0.9641 33 Arizona 0.1329 
9 Pennsylvania 0.9232 34 Arkansas 0.1190 
10 Florida 0.8105 35 Oregon 0.1189 
11 Ohio 0.7547 36 Maine 0.1188 
12 Illinois 0.6792 37 Mississippi 0.1181 
13 California 0.6729 38 Iowa 0.1140 
14 Virginia 0.5342 39 Oklahoma 0.0998 
15 North Carolina 0.4697 40 Kansas 0.0848 
16 New Hampshire 0.4413 41 Utah 0.0720 
17 Tennessee 0.4191 42 Nebraska 0.0626 
18 Indiana 0.4174 43 Nevada 0.0488 
19 Georgia 0.3735 44 New Mexico 0.0432 
20 South Carolina 0.3497 45 Idaho 0.0343 
21 Michigan 0.2892 46 South Dakota 0.0247 
22 Vermont 0.2781 47 North Dakota 0.0242 
23 Washington 0.2751 48 Montana 0.0169 
24 Kentucky 0.2672 49 Wyoming 0.0115 
25 Wisconsin 0.2466    
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Table 2-9: The Effect of State-Specific Medical Policies 
Dependent Variable: Log Mortality Rate of Various Diseases (%) 
 Licensing Policy Dummy Doctors per Capita Dummy Doctors per Square Mile Dummy 
 Heart Disease Cancer Stroke Heart Disease Cancer Stroke Heart Disease Cancer Stroke 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0656*** -0.0533*** -0.0881*** -0.0660*** -0.0532*** -0.0882*** -0.0666*** -0.0543*** -0.0899*** 
 (-8.06) (-5.73) (-8.24) (-8.11) (-5.73) (-8.25) (-8.17) (-5.81) (-8.41) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0246*** -0.0150* -0.0567*** -0.0125 -0.0107 -0.0525*** -0.0135* -0.0109 -0.0565*** 
 (-2.73) (-1.84) (-4.92) (-1.59) (-1.47) (-4.89) (-1.70) (-1.49) (-5.29) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state 
× Stringent Reciprocity Rules 0.0148*** 0.0058* 0.0068 - - - - - - 
 (2.89) (1.79) (1.07)       
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state 
× (Doctors per capita > median) - - - 0.0060 0.0084*** 0.0091* - - - 
    (1.46) (3.49) (1.73)    
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state 
× (Doctors per Square Mile > median) - - - - - - 0.0090** 0.0106*** 0.0187*** 
       (2.08) (4.06) (3.24) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0517*** -0.0154 -0.0165 -0.0516*** -0.0151 -0.0162 -0.0529*** -0.0171 -0.0189 
 (-3.54) (-1.17) (-0.86) (-3.53) (-1.15) (-0.85) (-3.62) (-1.30) (-0.99) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0346** -0.0071 -0.0234 -0.0323** -0.0040 -0.0208 -0.0312** -0.0024 -0.0165 
 (-2.49) (-0.69) (-1.10) (-2.30) (-0.39) (-0.98) (-2.23) (-0.23) (-0.78) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_in-state -0.0052 -0.0172*** -0.0169** -0.0051 -0.0169*** -0.0167** -0.0052 -0.0176*** -0.0173** 
 (-1.07) (-3.64) (-2.40) (-1.04) (-3.60) (-2.38) (-1.08) (-3.73) (-2.47) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0066 -0.0073 -0.0447*** -0.0042 -0.0041 -0.0423*** -0.0030 -0.0019 -0.0397*** 
 (-1.12) (-1.13) (-5.30) (-0.70) (-0.64) (-5.03) (-0.50) (-0.30) (-4.62) 
No. of State Fixed Effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
No. of Observations 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,108 3,108 3,105 
R-squared 0.705 0.722 0.518 0.705 0.722 0.519 0.705 0.722 0.520 
a Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. Other control variables include % Black, % Asian, % Hispanic, % of uninsured, % of > 
65years old, per capita income, % in poverty, % of < high school, and unemployment rate (%). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2-10: The Effect of State-Specific Medical Policies 
Dependent Variable: Mortality Rates of Various Diseases (%) 
 Licensing Policy Dummy Doctors per Capita Dummy Doctors per Square Mile Dummy 
 Heart Disease Cancer Stroke Heart Disease Cancer Stroke Heart Disease Cancer Stroke 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0173*** -0.0083*** -0.0059*** -0.0174*** -0.0083*** -0.0059*** -0.0176*** -0.0085*** -0.0060*** 
 (-8.52) (-7.31) (-9.26) (-8.57) (-7.31) (-9.26) (-8.61) (-7.41) (-9.38) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0083*** -0.0028** -0.0034*** -0.0046** -0.0022** -0.0030*** -0.0048** -0.0022** -0.0032*** 
 (-3.47) (-2.41) (-4.95) (-2.28) (-2.07) (-4.70) (-2.35) (-2.05) (-4.94) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state 
× Stringent Reciprocity Rules 0.0045*** 0.0009* 0.0007 - - - - - - 
 (2.93) (1.74) (1.48)       
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state 
× (Doctors per capita > median) - - - 0.0015 0.0012*** 0.0005 - - - 
    (1.25) (3.09) (1.31)    
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state 
× (Doctors per Square Mile > median) - - - - - - 0.0020 0.0014*** 0.0011** 
       (1.57) (3.28) (2.58) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0118*** -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0117*** -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0120*** -0.0026 -0.0011 
 (-3.03) (-1.25) (-0.72) (-3.01) (-1.22) (-0.72) (-3.09) (-1.36) (-0.84) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0110*** -0.0012 -0.0029* -0.0104*** -0.0008 -0.0027* -0.0102*** -0.0006 -0.0025 
 (-2.80) (-0.71) (-1.79) (-2.63) (-0.45) (-1.69) (-2.58) (-0.36) (-1.54) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_in-state -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0018*** -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0018*** -0.0030*** -0.0032*** -0.0018*** 
 (-2.71) (-4.72) (-4.34) (-2.68) (-4.67) (-4.31) (-2.71) (-4.80) (-4.39) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0026* -0.0017* -0.0025*** -0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0023*** -0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0022*** 
 (-1.85) (-1.78) (-5.27) (-1.37) (-1.28) (-4.89) (-1.18) (-1.01) (-4.50) 
No. of State Fixed Effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
No. of Observations 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,108 3,108 3,105 
R-squared 0.685 0.743 0.478 0.684 0.744 0.478 0.684 0.744 0.479 
a Specialists refer to cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2-1: State Variation in Mortality Rates (per 100,000 Residents) for Heart Disease 
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Figure 2-2: State Variation in Mortality Rates (per 100,000 Residents) for Cancer 
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Figure 2-3: State Variation in Mortality Rates (per 100,000 Residents) for Stroke 
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Figure 2-4: Spatial Attenuation of the Influence of Nearby Medical Professionals and the Impact of State Borders 
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Figure 2-5: Number of Doctors (Nurses, Hospital Beds) within a Given Circle Calculated Using Proportional Sum Method 
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Chapter 3 Intermediate Input Sharing in the Hospital Service Industry 
3.1 Introduction 
The distribution of health care resources in the United States displays a high degree of 
spatial concentration.  As shown in Figure 3-1, for instance, a large fraction of hospital beds are 
located in a small number of counties, including California, the Chicago area, the Northeast 
coastal area (from Washington D.C. to Boston), and Florida.  The tremendous concentration of 
health care capacity in a small number of locations has received much attention in recent years.  
However, most efforts have focused on documentation of this phenomenon and less progress has 
been made in explaining why medical services are spatially concentrated.33  A better 
understanding of the phenomenon is important because restricted access to medical services is 
one of the leading causes for poor health care outcomes in lightly developed areas.34 
Among those studies that have sought to explain geographic concentration of medical 
services, many have considered population distribution as a potential driving force.  Health care 
resources are drawn to areas with the largest number of residents demanding medical services.  
This is, in part, due to high transportation costs associated with delivering these services to 
patients.35  However, as indicated by Goodman, et al. (1996) and Goodman (2004), concentration 
of local population only partly explains geographic variation in hospital services.  This is also 
illustrated by Figure 3-2, which shows that county-level measures of hospital beds per resident 
still display considerable spatial concentration.  The evidence suggests that, in addition to 
geographic variation in the distribution of population, there exist other mechanisms that may also 
contribute to spatial concentration of medical services.  
                                                 
33 The Dartmouth Atlas Project, for example, has devoted a huge amount of resources in past twenty years to documentation of 
dramatic differences in the spatial distribution of medical care services across the United States.  See 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org. 
34 See, for example, Casey, et al (2001), and Coughlin, et al (2002).   
35 In this respect, the health care industry can be classified as a “market-oriented” industry.  See O’Sullivan (2006) for details. 
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This chapter draws on previous literature on agglomeration and related spillover effects 
(e.g. the sharing of intermediate inputs) to highlight two important and related factors, apart from 
spatial concentration of population, that help to explain geographic variation in access to medical 
services.  The first is whether local agglomeration of medical services fosters spillover effects 
that enhance the efficiency with which medical services are provided and which, therefore, 
contribute to spatial concentration in the hospital service industry.  Identification of such a 
relationship is difficult and is achieved here indirectly by considering a second, closely related 
feature of the medical service industry.  Specifically, I estimate and characterize conditions under 
which hospitals contract out for intermediate inputs when providing certain types of medical 
services.  Some further background will help to put this in perspective. 
There is an extensive literature on agglomeration economies, which has provided 
evidence that productivity is often enhanced when companies operate in agglomerated 
locations.36  Rosenthal and Strange (2004) describe various microfoundations of agglomeration 
economies for which productivity spillovers might occur.37  One of these microfoundations is 
that spatial concentration of a particular industry attracts specialized intermediate input 
producers and encourages intermediate input sharing.  I explore the existence of similar spillover 
effects in the hospital service industry by examining whether the sharing of intermediate medical 
inputs contributes to spillovers from spatial concentration of medical services.  In doing so, I 
                                                 
36 See Quigley (1998), Rosenthal and Strange (2004), and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) for surveys of this literature.  Numerous 
studies have provided evidence that external economies of scale enhance productivity in the manufacturing sector, but few of 
these studies have focused on the health care industry.  Baicker and Chandra (2010), Cohen and Pall (2008), and Li (2012) are 
among the few that examine productivity gains from agglomeration in the health care industry. 
37 Marshall (1920) brought up three mechanisms through which agglomeration economies might take place: intermediate input 
sharing, labor market pooling, and knowledge spillovers.  See, for instance, Glaeser and Maré (2001) and Moretti (2004) for 
evidence of knowledge spillovers, Holmes (1999) and Ellison, and Glaeser, and Kerr (2010) for evidence of input sharing, and 
Rosenthal and Strange (2001) and Costa and Kahn (2000) for evidence of labor market pooling. There are many other sources of 
agglomeration that were not discussed in Marshall, including home market effects, urban consumption opportunities, and rent-
seeking. See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a detailed discussion. 
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provide evidence that agglomeration economies likely enhance productivity in the hospital 
service industry, while also identifying one channel through which that might occur.   
My findings in this chapter contribute to both the health economics literature and the 
urban/agglomeration literature.  They contribute to the health economics literature by 
emphasizing a relatively new perspective – external economies of scale – that helps to explain 
geographic variation in access to medical services.  For example, evidence of agglomeration 
economies in the health care sector suggests that spatial concentration of health care services 
may generate cost savings, which are likely to be especially important going forward as U. S. 
hospitals face increasing pressure to become more efficient.  This chapter also contributes to the 
agglomeration literature by providing evidence that intermediate input sharing is more prevalent 
in agglomerated locations.  As with Holmes (1999), such patterns are consistent with the idea 
that input sharing is an important microfoundation of agglomeration economies.  To date, 
however, few studies have provided evidence of input sharing as a source of agglomeration 
economies. 
The analysis to follow also examines the influence of the local industrial organization on 
the potential for input sharing and related external economies of scale in the hospital service 
industry.38  Chinitz (1961) suggested that “large firms are … less of a stimulus to the creation of 
a community of independent suppliers.”  Similar arguments have been made by Jacobs (1969), 
Piore and Sabel (1984), and Saxenian (1994).  By focusing on firms’ entry decisions, Rosenthal 
and Strange (2010) found that small firms play an important role in the generation of 
agglomeration economies.  Glaeser, Kerr, and Ponzetto (2010) documented that small firms have 
a stronger connection with subsequent employment growth than large establishments, which is 
                                                 
38 Industrial organization in this context refers to the composition of the local industry: whether the local industry is composed of 
a large number of small establishments or is dominated by a small number of large establishments.  
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consistent with Chinitz’s view.  I also examine this organization-agglomeration relationship but 
from a different perspective.  Specifically, I consider whether the “Chinitz” effect, as captured by 
the percentage of small hospitals in a county, contributes to local hospitals’ decisions to 
outsource for intermediate services. 
Four types of intermediate medical services are examined in the paper: clinical 
laboratory, blood bank, anatomical laboratory, and CAT scan.  Using the 2009 provider of 
services (POS) file, Table 3-1 reports how the provision of a particular service varies across 
different counties.39  Clinical laboratory services are more universally provided compared with 
other services, but they are still available in just eighty-four percent of the counties in the United 
States.  At the other extreme, CAT scan services are available in only forty-two percent of the 
counties.  This evidence coincides with geographic variation in access to medical services 
documented above.   
As a first step in explaining spatial concentration of medical services, I draw on central 
place theory and explore further the influence of local concentrations of population.40  Central 
place theory suggests that three factors influence an industry’s tendency to locate in populated 
areas: the extent of internal economies of scale, per capita demand for the industry’s product, and 
travel/shipping cost.  If the provision of a particular service is associated with low per capita 
demand and high fixed costs (i.e. deep internal economies of scale), the service will only be 
provided in heavily populated areas with sufficient numbers of potential customers to take 
advantage of internal economies of scale by spreading out fixed costs.  High transport costs 
                                                 
39 http://www.cms.gov. The POS file is the primary dataset that this chapter draws on.  It provides detailed hospital-level 
information on how a particular intermediate service is provided, the scale and property of the hospital, etc.  This information can 
be aggregated to the county-level using the existing county identifier. 
40 Central place theory is a key building block of economic geography (King, 1984).  It was developed by Christaller (1933) and 
Lösch (1940) and is used to predict the number, size, and scope of cities in a region.  As shown recently by Hsu (2008) and Mori 
et al. (2008), central place theory also provides a route to explain empirical regularities in city size distribution and industrial 
locations.   
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further increase this tendency by limiting the geographic scope of a firm’s market area. This 
implies that the decision to provide a service will depend on proximity to local concentrations of 
population, the effect of which will attenuate with geographic distance as travel costs to a given 
hospital increase.41  I confirm these patterns. 
Two technical hurdles must be overcome in order to measure the influence of 
agglomeration economies and the “Chinitz” effect on the propensity of hospitals to outsource for 
certain types of medical services.  The first concerns the geographic scope of agglomeration 
economies.  This chapter initially assumes that spillover effects from agglomeration do not 
extend beyond county boundaries.  This is convenient given readily available county-level data.  
However, it is somewhat unsatisfying in that the benefits firms derive from proximity to each 
other are likely to attenuate with distance.42  To further capture the spatial extent of spillover 
effects from agglomeration, local distribution of medical services (e.g., number of hospital beds) 
is measured in concentric rings drawn around the geographic centroid of each county.  The 
influence of activity in each concentric ring on the propensity of outsourcing for intermediate 
services is then examined.  Evidence of a lesser effect from activity in more distant concentric 
rings is consistent with the spatial attenuation of spillover effects. 
A second empirical challenge faced in this chapter is a sample selection issue. Each 
hospital makes a series of decisions, regarding whether to provide a service and, if so, how to 
provide the service.  It is possible that, even after controlling for a variety of variables, hospitals 
that choose to provide a given intermediate service are not randomly selected from the overall 
distribution of hospitals, but are correlated with hospitals’ outsourcing propensities.  This implies 
                                                 
41 There are further implications that are drawn out of central place theory, including that the composition of activities tend to be 
different for large areas and small areas, and in that sense, small town is not merely a smaller microcopy of large towns.   
42 See Rosenthal and Strange (2003, 2005, 2008), Andersson, Quigley, and Wilhelmsson (2009), and Arzaghi and Henderson 
(2008). 
45 
 
 
 
that the estimated effect of agglomeration economies and the “Chinitz” effect based on the 
selected sample could suffer from selection bias.  
To address this concern, I estimate a bivariate probit model that explicitly controls for 
sample selection.  The first equation considers whether a hospital provides a given service while 
the second considers how the service is provided conditional on the service being made 
available.  Identification of the model is from two sources.  The first is the nonlinearity of the 
probit functional form.  In addition, I adopt a set of exclusion conditions based on the following 
argument.   I assume that the decision to provide a service depends on both the demand and 
supply for the service.  How that service is provided (i.e., outsource or provide in-house), 
however, is based on efforts to minimize cost, and for that reason, is assumed to be driven only 
by the underlying technology and factor prices.43  Hence, local population attributes, which are 
shifters of demand, are omitted from a second stage model of how medical services are provided.  
Using the above methodology, I obtain estimates for both the agglomeration effect and 
the “Chinitz” effect.  Results show that hospitals in more concentrated areas and areas with a 
higher percentage of small hospitals are more likely to outsource for intermediate medical 
services.  In addition, the effect of an increase in the scale of local hospital service industry rises 
at a declining rate.  For example, for a county with just ten hospital beds, adding one thousand 
additional beds will increase the propensity of local hospitals to outsource clinical lab services by 
2.05 percentage points (relative to the mean 36.43 %).  This effect drops to 1.09 percentage 
points if the county has ten thousand hospital beds present.  Similar patterns are also identified 
for blood bank services and CAT scan services.  Despite the nonlinearity of the relationship, 
estimated effects of agglomeration economies tend to be positive and significant.  These patterns 
are consistent with the presence of agglomeration economies in the hospital service industry in 
                                                 
43 Factor prices are assumed to be exogenously given in the context of this chapter. 
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that they confirm that the sharing of intermediate medical services is more prevalent in 
agglomerated locations.   
The estimated “Chinitz” effects on the probability of outsourcing are also generally 
positive and significant.  For instance, an increase in the share of small hospitals in a county, 
from 20% to 30%, is associated with a 1.86 percentage point increase in the outsourcing 
probability for clinical lab services (relative to the mean 36.43 %).44  The corresponding effects 
on the propensity of outsourcing blood bank services, anatomical laboratory services, and CAT 
scan services are 2.74 (relative to 48.04), 1.73 (relative to 60.84), and 2.43 (relative to 21.57) 
percentage point increases, respectively.  
Finally, similar to the existing urban literature that considers the geographic extent of 
agglomeration economies, the spillover effects attenuate when moving further away from the 
centroid of the county.  To get a sense of the magnitude, for clinical lab services, doubling the 
number of hospital beds at a distance between 50 miles and 75 miles increases the outsourcing 
probability by 1.96 percentage points (relative to the mean 36.43 %).  This is 6.44 percentage 
points smaller than if the change occurred within 25 miles instead.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows:  Section 3.2 draws on central place theory and 
measures the extent to which the size of local population helps to explain geographic variation in 
the provision of health care services.  Section 3.3 investigates the existence of agglomeration 
economies in the hospital service industry and, more precisely, whether intermediate input 
sharing is an important microfoundation of agglomeration economies.  Finally, section 3.4 
concludes.  
                                                 
44 Small hospitals here are defined as those with number of hospital beds below the 10th percentile. 
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3.2 County-Level Analysis: Local Population and Medical Services 
This section is motivated by central place theory and estimates a simple relationship 
between the size of local population at various distance bands and the presence of intermediate 
medical services in a county.  Table 3-3 reports the estimated coefficients from a set of probit 
models that evaluate whether a service is provided in a given county or not.45   Table 3-4 shows 
the marginal effects of local population at various distance bands on the probability of providing 
intermediate services in a county. 
The population measures are transformed into logs so that the marginal effects can be 
interpreted as semi-elasticities.  For clinical laboratory services, doubling population within 25 
miles is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in the probability of providing the service 
in a county.  The corresponding marginal effects for blood bank, anatomical lab, and CAT scan 
services are 8.8, 14.2, and 15.3 percentage point increases, respectively.  This implies that the 
local population at closer distances is a key driver of the provision of intermediate medical 
services.  
As the radius of the concentric ring gets larger, the sign of marginal effects alternates, but 
the magnitude consistently attenuates.46  The attenuation pattern of the estimated marginal effects 
is striking and is plotted in Figure 3-4 to facilitate review.  These results indicate that the 
presence of an intermediate medical service in a county depends largely on the scale of the 
population nearby; population further away also matters, but to a smaller extent. 
 
                                                 
45 Data sources include the provider of service (POS) file and the area resource file (ARF).  The POS is as mentioned earlier in 
the paper.  The ARF will be discussed in Section 3.2.  The specific techniques used to construct the concentric ring variables are 
described also in Section 3.2.  Summary statistics of variables that enter the county-level regressions are provided in Table 3-2. 
46 The alternation of the sign resembles patterns observed from autoregressive processes in time series models and can be 
revealed as the inherent nature of the spatial structure.  It may also reflect a measurement issue associated with how the 
concentric rings are created or the misjudgment on spatial spans arbitrarily chosen. 
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3.3 Hospital-Level Analysis: Agglomeration and Input Sharing 
This section explores whether agglomeration economies exist in the hospital service 
industry and, more precisely, whether the sharing of intermediate inputs is an important 
microfoundation of agglomeration economies.  These questions will be addressed by establishing 
the relationship between agglomeration and hospital outsourcing decisions.  
3.3.1 Empirical Model 
As described earlier, a bivariate probit model with three cells is used to control for 
possible sample selection that might arise when hospital outsourcing propensities are correlated 
with the decision to provide intermediate services.  Identification is based on both the 
nonlinearity of the probit function and a set of exclusion restrictions.  For the latter, I argue that 
supply and demand jointly determine whether a service is provided, but how that service is 
provided is based on the underlying technology, and in that sense, is driven solely by the supply 
function.  Hence, demand shifters are included in the first stage regression of whether a service is 
provided but omitted from the second stage regression of how the service is provided.47  
The demand for medical services provided in hospital  is characterized by the price ( ), 
the quantity of services provided ( ), and potential demand shifters, as represented by local 
demographics ( ).  That is (  is omitted for convenience), 
 , . (3.1)
The supply function associated with providing an intermediate medical service in-house 
is shown as follows  
 , , (3.2)
                                                 
47 This assumption is also largely supported by empirical evidence that the estimates associated with demand shifters in an probit 
model of outsourcing decisions tend to be insignificant.  Imposing the exclusion restrictions strengthens identification and helps 
to avoid multicolinearity.   
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where  is the quantity of services provided by this hospital and  represents the level and the 
type of capital in the hospital.  The level of capital refers to the size of the hospital, which is 
measured by the number of beds in the hospital in the empirical work to follow.  The type of 
capital varies with the hospital’s attributes — teaching hospital, public hospital, etc.   is 
assumed to be exogenous since it is hard to vary the scale or the nature of a hospital in the short 
run.  
An alternative way that a hospital provides an intermediate service is to outsource the 
service to nearby intermediate service suppliers.  The supply function, in this instance, is 
sensitive to the scale of the hospital industry in the local area and the size distribution of nearby 
hospitals that may or may not contribute to a "Chinitz" effect.  I treat variable    as a measure of 
the extent of agglomeration economies.  Variable    is used to represent the “Chinitz” effect.  
The average cost associated with providing the service through outsourcing is as shown below, 
 , , , . (3.3)
In this expression, , ,  shifts down the average cost function but does not change 
its shape.48  I argue that both ∂q/ ∂  and ∂q/ ∂  are positive, meaning that the agglomeration 
effect and the “Chinitz” effect are both expected to shift down the average cost curve.  The 
former is consistent with the idea that agglomerated firms offer a potentially higher demand for 
intermediate services that promotes the emergence of specialized suppliers, which then results in 
lower outsourcing prices.49   The latter is based on the argument that the presence of small 
companies is more likely to attract intermediate input suppliers due to their higher tendency to 
outsource.  The emergence of specialized input providers further brings down the average cost 
                                                 
48 , ,   is assumed to be independent of  conditional on ,  and .   
49 See Ono (2001), for example. 
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for not only small companies but also for all other neighboring establishments that draw on the 
same input market.50  
The decision on whether to contract out for intermediate inputs when providing certain 
types of medical services is based on efforts to minimize cost, and for that reason, is considered 
to be driven only by the underlying technology and factor prices.  Factor prices are assumed to 
be exogenously given.  The outsourcing propensity is, hence, determined solely by technological 
factors (i.e., the agglomeration effect, the “Chinitz” effect, and the type/level of the capital 
associated with each hospital) that might shift  down to .  Since, as with other 
markets, the first stage decision – whether provide or not – depends on both the supply and 
demand for the service, I argue that I can exclude demand shifters from a second stage 
outsourcing equation and use them as exclusion restrictions that help to identify the model. 
3.3.2 Data and Variables 
This chapter draws on two primary data sources: the provider of service (POS) file and 
the area resource file (ARF).  The POS file, as mentioned earlier, contains hospital-level 
information on intermediate service provisions, the scale and property of each hospital, etc.  The 
ARF, published by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), is a collection of 
county-level data from more than fifty sources.51  It offers health-related information on 
personnel and facility counts, hospital utilization, hospital expenditures, social characteristics, 
etc.  Both of these datasets are used for the county-level analysis in Section 2 and the exploration 
of outsourcing decisions at the hospital level in this section.  
                                                 
50 This idea is consistent with findings in Rosenthal and Strange (2010), and Glaeser, Kerr, and Ponzetto (2010). 
51 These sources include American Medical Association, American Hospital Association, US Census Bureau, Center for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Center for Health Statistics, etc.  Details can be found at 
http://arf.hrsa.gov/. 
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In the POS file, I focus on four types of medical services that are commonly 
characterized as intermediate services: clinical laboratory, blood bank, anatomical laboratory, and 
CAT scan.52  The clinical laboratory provides routine tests in the areas of hematology, chemistry, 
transfusion services, and microbiology.  It is responsible for recording appropriate results on 
patients' charts in a manner that can be easily interpreted by physicians to guide further diagnosis 
and treatment.  A blood bank is a repository of blood components gathered as a result of blood 
donation.  It stores, preserves, and, eventually, provides blood products for patients in need.  The 
anatomical laboratory provides specific services for surgical tissue specimens and cytology 
specimens.  CAT scan (also called CT scan) is an X-ray technique that allows relatively safe, 
painless, and rapid diagnosis in previously inaccessible areas of the body and is an essential tool 
used for the diagnosis of many internal diseases.  In a complete treatment process, the above 
services are considered as inputs since they are responsible for preparing intermediate reports or 
products that will facilitate further treatment fulfilled by doctors and nurses at a later stage.  
Four situations are specified in the POS file regarding the provision of these intermediate 
medical services: not provided, provided by staff (in-house), provided by arrangement or 
agreement (outsourcing), and provided by staff and through agreement (both).  For the purpose 
of this chapter, the last two categories are grouped together to capture the idea of whether a 
hospital relies on outside specialized intermediate service providers at all.  Table 3-5 summaries 
service provisions of various intermediate medical services for all hospitals in the data.  Clinical 
laboratory services are most widely provided – 97% of hospitals offer this type of service – while 
CAT scan services are available in only 24% of hospitals in the country.  The percentage of 
                                                 
52 I also experimented with other types of services, such as diagnostic radiology, therapeutic radiology, MRI, etc, and obtained 
similar results.  To avoid proliferation of results, I only focus on four types of intermediate services that are more frequently used. 
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hospitals that choose to outsource for a particular intermediate service out of the hospitals that 
offer the service also varies across different types of services. 
The extent of agglomeration economies is initially captured by the total number of 
hospital beds in the county in which a hospital is located.  To take into consideration potential 
spatial attenuation of agglomeration economies, this variable is then replaced by a set of 
concentric ring variables.  Each of these variables measures hospital beds present at a given 
distance band from the centroid of the county: 0 to 25 miles, 25 to 50 miles, 50 to 75 miles, and 
75 to 100 miles.  
Several steps are taken to form these concentric ring variables.  First, mapping software 
(MapInfo and MapBasic) is used to draw circles of radius 25, 50, 75, and 100 miles around the 
geographic centroid of each county.  Second, treating hospital beds within a given county as 
uniformly distributed throughout the area, the number of beds contained in a created circle is 
calculated by constructing a proportional sum of the beds for those portions of the counties 
intersected by a given circle.53  Finally, hospital beds for adjacent circles, such as beds within a 
25-mile ring and that within the corresponding 50-mile ring, are differenced to obtain the number 
of hospital beds within the corresponding concentric ring.54   
The “Chinitz” effect is represented by the percentage of small hospitals.  The goal is to 
capture whether small establishments with flexible structure and higher motivation for 
innovation play an important role in generating productivity spillovers.  Small hospitals are 
defined as hospitals with less than or equal to twenty-one hospital beds, which correspond to the 
10th percentile based on the ranking of hospital size as shown in Table 3-6.  As further robustness 
                                                 
53 The construction of the proportional sum measure is better illustrated in Figure 3-3.  For example, for county A, a 25-mile 
circle around its centroid intersects seven neighboring counties.  The number of population within the circle is calculated as the 
sum of the population belonging to each shaded portion of these counties (including A itself) that overlaps the circle, assuming 
population within each county is uniformly distributed throughout the area.  
54 Same technique is used to construct the population concentric ring variables used in Section 2.2. 
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checks, estimates are also reported when small hospitals are defined as those with number of 
hospital beds below the 5th percentile or the 25th percentile.  
The number of beds in a hospital captures the level of the capital – the extent to which 
internal economies of scale might affect the hospital’s tendency to outsource for intermediate 
services.  The type of the capital is represented by a set of dummy variables indicating whether 
the hospital is a teaching hospital, a public hospital, a short-term hospital, a children’s hospital, 
or a psychiatric hospital.55  Variables that shift the demand curve are captured by a series of 
county-level social demographic attributes and are obtained from the ARF.  These variables 
include the number of population in a county, the percentage of uninsured population, the 
percentage of residents greater than 65 years old, per capita income, the percentage of people in 
poverty, the percentage of Black inhabitants, the percentage of Hispanic inhabitants, and the 
percentage of people with lower than high school education.  Summary statistics for these 
variables at the hospital level are provided in Table 3-7. 
3.3.3 Results 
A. Model Coefficients 
Table 3-8 reports estimated coefficients from bivariate probit models that address 
possible concerns about sample selection.  Before discussing the coefficients, one thing that 
stands out in Table 3-8 is that the estimated correlation for two parts of model is strong and 
significantly identified.  Estimated error correlations are generally greater than 0.8 and even 
reach up to 0.94 for CAT scan service.  This indicates that a hospital’s tendency to outsource 
intermediate services is strongly correlated with how the sample is selected.  Potentially, 
                                                 
55 A teaching hospital is a hospital that provides clinical education and training to future and current doctors, nurses, and other 
health professionals, in addition to delivering medical care to patients. A public hospital is a hospital that is owned by 
a government and receives government funding. A short-term hospital is a hospital intended for short-term medical and/or 
surgical treatment and care.  A children's hospital is a hospital that offers its services exclusively to children.  A psychiatric 
hospital is a hospital specializing in the treatment of serious mental disorders. 
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estimates of the outsourcing equation, based solely on hospitals providing the service, may suffer 
from selection bias.  The degree of bias would be reflected by the difference between the 
estimated coefficients from the probit model and those from the bivariate probit model.  In this 
study, probit models tend to overestimate the coefficient associated with the first order of 
agglomeration measure by 7% [(7.50-7.03)/7.03] for clinical laboratory services, 43% [(5.00-
3.49)/3.49] for blood bank services, and 177% [(9.02-3.26)/3.26] for CAT scan services.  This 
suggests that a careful assessment of outsourcing decisions requires proper handling of the 
selection problem.  Therefore, I mainly focus on estimates from bivariate probit models in the 
following analysis. 
Two patterns are present when examining the estimated coefficients of bivariate probit 
models.  First, three key explanatory variables – the measures for agglomeration economies, the 
“Chinitz” effect, and the level of capital for each hospital – affect the second-stage outsourcing 
decisions in a nonlinear fashion.56  Agglomeration economies and the “Chinitz” effect tend to 
impose a positive influence on hospital outsourcing propensities, though at a decreasing rate.57  
The hospital’s own scale is negatively correlated with the decision to outsource, and the effect 
gets smaller as the number of beds in the hospital becomes larger.  Since only raw estimates are 
reported in these tables, I will not discuss the magnitude of these effects here.  Careful 
interpretation for marginal effects will be addressed below. 
Second, agglomeration economies and the “Chinitz” effect tend not to be statistically 
influential in the first-stage “provide” equation.  This may reflect the nature of the sample: there 
are not many hospitals positioned at the margin where a slight decrease in average cost induced 
                                                 
56 To further capture the nonlinear feature of the influence of variables that represent economies of scale (either internal or 
external), I also adopt quadratic functional forms for measures of agglomeration economies, the “Chinitz” effect and the level of 
the capital in a hospital.  I also experimented with including cubic terms to capture further curvatures of the relationship.  Results 
show that the third order terms tend to be insignificant.   
57 The “Chinitz” effect here is captured by the percentage of small hospitals whose number of beds does not exceed 21.  This 
definition is adjusted later for robustness checks.   
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by outsourcing opportunities would make a significant difference in whether to provide a 
particular intermediate service.  It is also likely that agglomeration economies and the “Chinitz” 
effect influence the decision to “provide” through other channels other than potential cost saving 
generated by external economies of scale.58   
One concern to the robustness of the estimates is the definition of small hospitals that is 
used to construct proxies for the “Chinitz” effect.  Small hospitals are initially defined as those 
with number of beds below the 10th percentile (21 hospital beds).  However, “small” is a relative 
term and there is no absolute definition for how small is “small” in this context.  It is useful to 
check how estimates vary when small hospitals are defined in another sensible way.  To this end, 
I experiment with defining small hospitals as those with the number of beds below the 5th 
percentile or the 25th percentile (corresponding to 15 beds and 33 beds, respectively).  Estimated 
coefficients of the second-stage bivariate probit models are reported in Table 3-9.  It shows that 
qualitatively the impact of the “Chinitz” effect is robust to various ways of defining small 
hospitals: the first-order proxy tends to be significantly positive, while the second-order tends to 
be significantly negative.  In the meanwhile, estimated coefficients associated with other 
explanatory variables are generally robust to how small hospitals are defined. 
B. Marginal Effects 
To properly interpret the results, two sources of nonlinearities need to be addressed: the 
nonlinearity of bivariate probit function and the inclusion of quadratic terms. 59  Figure 3-6 
shows the estimated marginal effects of three key explanatory variables (i.e., measures of 
                                                 
58 For example, hospitals may enter the market sequentially and make decisions in response to other hospitals’ actions.  If there 
have already been a lot of hospitals providing a service in a fully developed market, new-comers may choose not to provide this 
service to avoid competition.  This potential negative influence on the decision to “provide” may neutralize the expected positive 
effect of productivity spillovers discussed earlier and yields zero or even negative coefficients. 
59 An intermediate step in deriving the marginal effects, which has only addressed the nonlinearity of the bivariate probit model, 
is calculated but not reported.  These intermediate marginal effects are calculated as the average of the marginal effect associated 
with each observation.  Based on that, marginal effects for variables with quadratic specifications are then calculated as 
∆
∆
2  , where  and  represent the estimated partial effects of the first order and the second order regressors.   
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agglomeration economies, the “Chinitz” effect, and internal economies of scale) and how the 
effects change within the major range of corresponding regressors.60   
As shown in the upper panel of the figure, estimated marginal effects of agglomeration 
economies for clinical laboratory services, blood bank services, and CAT scan services are 
generally positive at a decreasing rate.  This suggests that hospitals in more concentrated areas 
are more likely to outsource intermediate services to specialized intermediate service suppliers, 
though this tendency decreases as the local industrial scale gets larger.  This evidence is 
consistent with findings in Holmes (1999) and further suggests that agglomeration of economic 
activities promotes emergence of specialized intermediate service suppliers and encourages 
intermediate input sharing.61 
The middle panel of Figure 3-6 shows the estimated impact of the “Chinitz” effect on the 
tendency of local hospitals to outsource for intermediate medical services.  For all four types of 
services considered in this chapter, the impact of the size distribution of local hospitals is 
generally positive at a decreasing rate.  This implies that higher percent of small hospitals are 
associated with a higher tendency to outsource, which is consistent with Chinitz’s view.  Another 
thing to notice is that the estimated marginal effect decreases, reaches zero, and may even turn 
negative near the very end of the horizontal axis for some services.  This suggests that when the 
local industry is comprised of “too many” small hospitals, individual hospitals may become less 
likely to outsource for intermediate medical services.  Possibly, it is caused by that the increase 
                                                 
60 For each of these variables, the horizontal axis extends up to the 95th percentile.  This helps to leave out the influence of 
potential outliers and capture the major trend of the marginal effect.  The vertical axis represents the effect of these variables on 
the probability of outsourcing intermediate medical services. 
61 Note that the agglomeration effect on a hospital’s decision to outsource anatomical lab services does not behave in the same 
way.  This is probably due to the specialized nature of this particular service.  The work of processing anatomical specimens 
requires more skilled medical professionals who may sort into big cities.  The lack of sufficient expertise in small cities forces 
local hospitals to contract out this particular service to facilities available in large cities. 
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in transaction costs associated with managing a lot of small hospitals tends to offset potential 
gains from specialization.  
The marginal effect of an individual hospital’s own scale is plotted in the lower panel of 
Figure 3-6.  Hospitals with larger scales are less likely to outsource intermediate services and the 
magnitude of this effect decreases as the number of beds in the hospital gets larger.  This 
evidence is in line with the idea that large hospitals are more likely to provide intermediate 
services in-house by taking advantages of cost savings generated by internal economies of scale.   
To get a better sense of magnitude, Table 6 reports the estimated effects of the three key 
explanatory variables on local hospital outsourcing propensities at selected points.  For a county 
with just ten hospital beds, adding one thousand additional beds increase local hospitals’ 
tendency to outsource intermediate services by 2.05 percentage points.  This effect drops to 1.09 
percentage points if the county has ten thousand hospital beds present.  Similar patterns are also 
identified for blood bank services and CAT scan services.  As for the “Chinitz” effect, an 
increase in small hospitals from 20% to 30% raises outsourcing propensities for clinical lab 
services, blood bank services, anatomical laboratory services, and CAT scan services by 1.86, 
2.74, 1.73, and 2.43 percentage points, respectively.  From the perspective of internal economies 
of scale, adding one hundred additional beds for a hospital with ten beds available decreases the 
probability of outsourcing clinical laboratory services by 5.94 percentage points.  This effect 
drops to 5.04 percentage points when the hospital has one hundred and fifty beds present and 
further reduces to 3.44 percentage points when the hospital has four hundred beds available.  
C. Attenuation  
In the above setting, agglomeration economies are assumed to take place within county 
boundaries.  However, the geographic scope of agglomeration effect is not necessarily restricted 
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by political boundaries as indicated in Rosenthal and Strange (2003, 2005, 2008), Andersson, 
Quigley, and Wilhelmsson (2009), and Arzaghi and Henderson (2008).  The next approach in this 
chapter is, therefore, geographically oriented.  Specifically, I adopt a specification with 
concentric ring variables that capture the number of beds within 0 to 25 miles, 25 miles to 50 
miles, 50 miles to 75 miles, and 75 miles to 100 miles, respectively.  These concentric ring 
measures help to investigate the geographic scope of agglomeration economies and the potential 
attenuation pattern.    
Table 3-11 reports estimated impacts of nearby medical activities within various distance 
bands on a hospital’s tendency to outsource for intermediate medical services.  The concentric 
ring variables are transformed into log terms. 62  The estimated marginal effects, hence, represent 
semi-elasticities.  As shown in the table, the magnitude of the estimated semi-elasticities 
attenuates as moving further away from the centroid of the county, which is consistent with 
previous findings in the urban literature.  The sign of the marginal effects alternates similarly as 
that in the county-level regressions, but the attenuation pattern is striking and is plotted in Figure 
3-7.   
Quantitatively speaking, for clinical lab services, doubling the number of hospital beds 
within 25 miles is associated with a 8.40 percentage point increase in the probability of 
outsourcing.  The influence of agglomeration economies drops to 1.96 percentage points if the 
change occurred at a distance between 50 miles and 75 miles.  Similarly for CAT scan services, 
the magnitude of the marginal effect decreases from 6.95 percentage points for the 25 mile ring 
to 2.70 percentage points for the 50-75 mile concentric ring.  The spatial attenuation is strong 
                                                 
62 The transformation is expected to capture the concavity of the relationship identified earlier.  It also helps to avoid 
a specification with both linear and quadratic terms associated with each of four concentric ring.  Accordingly, the 
number of beds in a hospital is transformed into logs as well.  The nonlinearity of the “Chinitz” effect is captured by 
a spline linear function with a kink at 0.3 that corresponds to the 75th percentile of the distribution of the percentage 
of small hospitals. 
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and clear for clinical lab, blood bank, and CAT scan services as the marginal effects for the 75-
100 mile concentric ring almost diminish to zero.  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter considers two important factors that may contribute to geographic variation 
in the hospital service industry.  The first factor is variation in population distribution:  medical 
resources are drawn to areas with higher demand for health care services.  The second factor, 
which receives relatively little attention in the literature, is agglomeration economies that may 
generate increasing returns and attract hospitals to locate in concentrated areas.  The existence of 
agglomeration economies in the hospital service industry is addressed indirectly by examining 
whether hospitals in agglomerated areas are more likely to outsource for intermediate medical 
services.  
I obtain the following results.  Firstly, evidence suggests that a particular service will be 
provided in a county when there is enough population nearby to spread out the high fixed costs 
associated with providing the service. The effect attenuates when people are located further 
away.  Secondly, agglomeration economies tend to increase the tendency of local hospitals to 
outsource for clinical lab services, blood bank services, and CAT scan services.  This effect also 
attenuates with geographic distance.  Thirdly, the “Chinitz” effect, as captured by the percentage 
of small hospitals in a county, increases local hospitals’ outsourcing propensities.  The evidence 
is robust to different ways of defining small hospitals.  Finally, large hospitals, measured by the 
number of beds in a hospital, are more likely to provide intermediate medical services in-house.  
This is consistent with the idea that large hospitals are more likely to exploit internal economies 
of scale when providing certain types of medical services. 
60 
 
 
 
The findings suggest that agglomeration economies exist in the hospital service industry.  
It further implies that, apart from concentration of population distribution, productivity spillovers 
generated by agglomeration may also contribute to geographic variation in access to medical 
services.  Furthermore, the evidence that hospitals in agglomerated locations are more likely to 
outsource for intermediate medical services is consistent with intermediate input sharing as an 
important microfoundation of agglomeration economies.   
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Table 3-1: Service Provision (County-Level) 
 
# of counties that 
 provide the service b 
% of counties that  
provide the service 
Clinical Laboratory 2,609 84.00% 
Blood Bank 2,419 77.88% 
Anatomical Laboratory 2,081 67.00% 
CAT Scan 1,291 41.56% 
a Sample at the county level contains 3,106 observations.   
bA particular service is provided in a county if there is at least one hospital in the county offering the service.   
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Table 3-2: Summary Statistics (County-Level) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Population_0-25 a 306348.21 824523.25 78.39 1.29e+07 
Population_25-50 b 768396.75 1165970.11 190.25 1.49e+07 
Population_50-75 c 1176949.02 1410475.25 24.25 1.57e+07 
Population_75-100 d 1567141.52 1662115.14 121.71 1.56e+07 
Population in the county 96396.59 311603.9 55 9878554 
% of Uninsured 20.73 6.69 7.91 50.62 
% of > 65 Years Old 15.63 4.22 2.60 37.21 
Per Capita Income 30346.55 8098.04 8579.00 132728.00 
% in Poverty 15.10 6.24 2.40 55.90 
% Black 8.68 14.44 0.00 86.50 
% Hispanic 6.21 12.05 0.10 97.50 
% of < High School 9.09 5.26 0.00 46.30 
a Population_0-25 represents the number of population within the 25-mile ring around the centroid of each county, 
assuming population within a given county is uniformly distributed throughout the area.   
b Population_25-50 represents the number of population within the donut ring bounded by the 25-mile and the 50-mile 
rings around the centroid of each county, assuming population within a given county is uniformly distributed 
throughout the area.   
c,d Population_50-75 and Population_75-100 are defined in a similar fashion.  
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Table 3-3: Estimated Coefficients from County-Level Probit Regressions 
 
Clinical  
Laboratory 
Blood  
Bank 
Anatomical  
Laboratory 
CAT 
Scan 
Log(Population_0-25) 0.276 0.316 0.404 0.393 
 (3.14) (3.96) (5.64) (7.08) 
Log(Population_25-50) -0.238 -0.258 -0.262 -0.212 
 (-1.86) (-2.22) (-2.52) (-2.58) 
Log(Population_50-75) 0.220 0.228 0.179 0.082 
 (2.35) (2.64) (2.27) (1.19) 
Log(Population_75-100) -0.102 -0.143 -0.100 -0.151 
 (-1.05) (-2.46) (-1.87) (-3.10) 
% of Uninsured -0.038 -0.032 -0.025 -0.014 
 (-6.87) (-6.42) (-5.35) (-3.27) 
% of > 65 Years Old 0.034 0.033 0.029 0.021 
 (3.88) (4.14) (3.91) (3.07) 
Per Capita Income 2.71e-05 2.64e-05 2.55e-05 1.51e-05 
 (3.18) (3.64) (3.65) (3.53) 
% in Poverty 0.044 0.038 0.040 0.033 
 (4.23) (4.37) (5.23) (5.24) 
% Black 0.001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 
 (0.47) (-0.71) (-4.10) (-1.43) 
% Hispanic 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.012 
 (5.51) (6.18) (7.04) (4.61) 
% of < High School -0.048 -0.041 -0.046 -0.029 
 (-6.17) (-5.82) (-6.87) (-4.44) 
No. of Observations 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 
Log Likelihood -1229.674 -1496.560 -1758.030 -1971.156 
Pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.089 0.108 0.065 
a Concentric ring variables representing the distribution of local population are defined the same as in Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-4: Marginal Effects from County-Level Probit Regressions  
 
Clinical  
Laboratory 
Blood  
Bank 
Anatomical  
Laboratory 
CAT 
Scan 
Log(Population_0-25) 0.060 0.088 0.142 0.153 
 (3.14) (3.96) (5.64) (7.08) 
Log(Population_25-50) -0.051 -0.072 -0.092 -0.082 
 (-1.86) (-2.22) (-2.52) (-2.58) 
Log(Population_50-75) 0.048 0.063 0.063 0.032 
 (2.35) (2.64) (2.27) (1.19) 
Log(Population_75-100) -0.022 -0.040 -0.035 -0.059 
 (-1.05) (-2.46) (-1.87) (-3.10) 
Predicted Prob. (at ) 0.865 0.803 0.694 0.412 
No. of Observations 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 
Log Likelihood -1229.674 -1496.560 -1758.030 -1971.156 
Pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.089 0.108 0.065 
a Marginal effects are calculated as the average of the marginal effects of all observations based on the estimated 
coefficients in Table 3-3.  Same set of control variables as in Table 3-3 is used for estimation.  Social economic control 
variables include % of Uninsured, % of > 65 Years Old, Per Capita Income, % in Poverty, % Black, % Hispanic, and % 
of < High School.  Concentric ring variables representing the distribution of local population are defined the same as in 
Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-5: Service Provision (Hospital-Level)  
 
# of hospitals  
That  
PROVIDE 
 
% of hospitals that 
 PROVIDE 
Out of 
ALL  
hospitals 
# of hospitals  
That 
OUTSOURCE 
 
% of hospitals that 
OUTSOURCE 
Out of 
Hospitals that 
PROVIDE 
Clinical Laboratory 9,077 97.08% 3,307 36.43% 
Blood Bank 6,788 72.60% 3,261 48.04% 
Anatomical Laboratory 5,759 61.59% 3,504 60.84% 
CAT Scan 2,207 23.60% 476 21.57% 
a Sample at the hospital level contains 9.350 observations. 
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Table 3-6: The Distribution of Hospital Beds 
Percentiles Beds Count in the Hospital 
1% 8 
5% 15 
10% 21 
25% 33 
50% 70 
75% 170 
90% 347 
95% 483 
99% 845 
a Detailed percentile summary statistics for the number of beds in a hospital. 
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Table 3-7: Summary Statistics (Hospital-Level) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
# Beds in the County 4152.54 8206.04 5 45749 
# Beds in the County_0-25 a 6065.30 10445.50 1.62 68514.82 
# Beds in the County_25-50 b 7154.91 9940.50 12.73 78377.31 
# Beds in the County_50-75 c 7977.45 9572.56 26.28 87175.69 
# Beds in the County_75-100 d 10208.54 12089.22 64.32 84101.07 
% of Small Hospitals 
(defined as # beds <= 15) e 0.05 0.13 0 1 
% of Small Hospitals 
(defined as # beds <= 21) f 0.11 0.19 0 1 
% of Small Hospitals 
(defined as # beds <= 33) g 0.26 0.29 0 1 
# Beds in the Hospital 138.34 178.53 1 2400 
Short-term Hospital h 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Children’s Hospital i 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Psychiatric Hospital g 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Public Hospital k 0.24 0.42 0 1 
Teaching Hospital l 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Population 750679.60 1630788 736 9878554 
% of Uninsured 20.58 6.86 7.90 49.45 
% of > 65 Years Old 13.94 3.84 4.81 37.23 
Per Capita Income 35829.61 11188.65 13854 132728 
% in Poverty 14.47 5.47 2.40 47.40 
% Black 12.11 14.71 0 86.53 
% Hispanic 10.40 14.37 0.12 97.54 
% of < High School 8.10 4.57 0.63 46.35 
a # Beds in the County_0-25 represents the number of hospital beds within the 25-mile ring around the centroid of each 
county, assuming beds within a given county are uniformly distributed throughout the area.   
b # Beds in the County_25-50 represents the number of hospital beds within the donut ring bounded by the 25-mile and 
50-mile rings around the centroid of each county, assuming beds within a given county are uniformly distributed 
throughout the area.   
c,d  # Beds in the County_50-75 and # Beds in the County_75-100 are defined in a similar fashion.  
e Small hospitals here are defined as the hospitals whose number of beds does not exceed 15.  In this way, the hospitals 
with the number of beds below the 5th percentile are labeled as small hospitals. 
f Small hospitals here are defined as the hospitals whose number of beds does not exceed 21.  In this way, the hospitals 
with the number of beds below the 10th percentile are labeled as small hospitals. 
g Small hospitals here are defined as the hospitals whose number of beds does not exceed 33.  In this way, the hospitals 
with the number of beds below the 25th percentile are labeled as small hospitals. 
h A short-term hospital is a hospital intended for short-term medical and/or surgical treatment and care.  
i A children's hospital is a hospital which offers its services exclusively to children. 
g A psychiatric hospital is a hospital specializing in the treatment of serious mental disorders. 
k A public hospital is a hospital  owned by a government and receiving government funding. 
l A teaching hospital is a hospital that provides clinical education and training to future and current doctors, nurses, and 
other health professionals, in addition to delivering medical care to patients. 
 
 
71 
 
 
 
Table 3-8: Estimates from Hospital-Level Bivariate Probit Models  
 Clinical Laboratory Blood Bank Anatomical Laboratory CAT Scan 
 Provide Outsource Provide Outsource Provide Outsource Provide Outsource 
 # Beds in the County 2.05e-05 7.03e-05 5.97e-06 3.49e-05 -2.02e-06 -1.14e-05 -2.64e-05 3.26e-05 
 (1.34) (12.79) (0.69) (6.53) (-0.25) (-2.01) (-2.83) (3.43) 
# Beds in the County Sq -1.60e-10 -1.63e-09 3.48e-10 -9.28e-10 8.52e-11 1.76e-10 9.24e-11 -8.47e-10 
 (-0.78) (-11.73) (2.00) (-6.91) (0.53) (1.30) (0.51) (-2.86) 
% of Small Hospitals -0.2158 1.0825 -0.1140 1.1689 0.1033 0.6438 -0.2851 0.9449 
(defined as # beds <= 21) (-0.51) (5.74) (-0.56) (6.06) (0.55) (2.82) (-1.45) (3.23) 
% of Small Hospitals Sq 0.9000 -1.1468 0.1891 -1.2034 -0.3696 -0.4294 0.0084 -1.1173 
(defined as # beds <= 21) (1.31) (-4.96) (0.75) (-5.31) (-1.67) (-1.41) (0.04) (-2.95) 
# Beds in the Hospital -0.0004 -0.0021 0.0018 -0.0022 0.0028 -0.0028 0.0016 -0.0004 
 (-1.11) (-10.70) (7.71) (-9.49) (12.67) (-11.31) (8.59) (-1.39) 
# Beds in the Hospital Sq 1.42e-07 1.07e-06 -7.76e-07 1.16e-06 -1.36e-06 1.40e-06 -5.75e-07 2.24e-07 
 (0.67) (6.35) (-3.57) (4.80) (-6.55) (5.58) (-3.66) (1.21) 
Short-term Hospital   0.9039 -0.7172 0.5664 -0.1911 0.7226 0.0315 -0.5699 -0.7237 
 (11.71) (-18.75) (13.93) (-3.69) (18.16) (0.40) (-14.55) (-11.94) 
Children’s Hospital  0.5373 -0.1454 0.3728 -0.0454 0.6535 0.0372 -1.0228 -1.3012 
 (2.00) (-1.05) (2.50) (-0.31) (4.70) (0.24) (-5.50) (-3.38) 
Psychiatric Hospital  0.0945 0.9609 -1.8288 -0.3133 -0.7635 0.0889 -1.2311 0.1318 
 (1.11) (14.37) (-26.83) (-1.85) (-12.85) (0.60) (-17.03) (0.65) 
Public Hospital  0.1818 -0.2561 0.0848 0.0117 -0.0178 0.1234 0.0195 -0.0611 
 (2.46) (-7.00) (2.15) (0.33) (-0.51) (3.01) (0.54) (-1.02) 
Teaching Hospital  0.1298 -0.0908 0.0466 -0.0800 0.1072 -0.1325 0.1467 0.0168 
 (1.65) (-2.17) (1.02) (-1.94) (2.59) (-3.08) (3.60) (0.24) 
Population -8.36e-08  -6.82e-08  7.47e-09  5.85e-08  
 (-0.91)  (-1.52)  (0.17)  (1.27)  
% of Uninsured 0.0084 - -0.0045 - -0.0063 - 0.0026 - 
 (1.50) - (-1.66) - (-2.58) - (0.99) - 
% of > 65 Years Old 0.0075 - 0.0071 - -0.0013 - 0.0092 - 
 (0.78) - (1.51) - (-0.30) - (2.06) - 
Per Capita Income -5.08e-06 - -8.98e-06 - -1.77e-07 - -1.45e-06 - 
 (-1.69) - (-5.13) - (-0.09) - (-0.80) - 
% in Poverty -0.0202 - -0.0150 - -0.0010 - 0.0064 - 
  (-2.20) - (-3.31) - (-0.23) - (1.49) - 
% Black -0.0023 - -0.0014 - -0.0043 - -0.0061 - 
 (-0.88) - (-1.05) - (-3.40) - (-4.50) - 
% Hispanic -0.0068 - -0.0036 - 0.0027 - -0.0056 - 
 (-1.87) - (-2.07) - (1.80) - (-3.35) - 
% of < High School 0.0540 - 0.0183 - -0.0125 - 0.0014 - 
 (4.13) - (3.63) - (-2.94) - (0.32) - 
Error Term Correlation (ρ) 0.8485 0.8744 0.8397 0.9373 
Wald Test for ρ=0 60.18 77.72 138.28 67.94 
No. of Observations 9,350 9,350 9,350 9,350 
Log Likelihood -5795.36 -8339.03 -8258.44 -5733.22 
72 
 
 
 
Table 3-9: Alternate Measures of Small Hospitals a  
 Clinical Laboratory Blood Bank Anatomical Laboratory CAT Scan 
 # Beds in the County 7.03e-05 6.21e-05 3.53e-05 3.78e-05 -1.20e-05 -5.92e-06 3.17e-05 2.52e-05 
 (13.00) (11.34) (6.60) (7.17) (-2.13) (-1.02) (3.43) (2.73) 
# Beds in the County Sq -1.63e-09 -1.44e-09 -9.45e-10 -9.85e-10 1.85e-10 7.63e-11 -8.24e-10 -6.90e-10 
 (-11.92) (-10.53) (-7.01) (-7.29) (1.37) (0.55) (-2.85) (-2.39) 
% of Small Hospitals 
(defined as # beds <= 15) 1.0198 - 1.2195 - 0.4550 - 1.3234 - 
 (4.22) - (4.84) - (1.58) - (3.17) - 
% of Small Hospitals Sq 
(defined as # beds <= 15)  -1.0422 - -1.5579 - -0.7189 - -2.0174 - 
 (-3.13) - (-4.67) - (-1.74) - (-2.74) - 
% of Small Hospitals 
(defined as # beds <= 33) - 0.8980 - 1.0794 - 0.6224 - -0.0586 
 - (5.83) - (6.95) - (3.44) - (-0.23) 
% of Small Hospitals Sq 
(defined as # beds <= 33)  - -1.2411 - -0.8997 - -0.1226 - -0.3398 
 - (-7.52) - (-5.62) - (-0.58) - (-1.28) 
# Beds in the Hospital -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0020 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0004 -0.0006 
 (-10.79) (-11.35) (-9.65) (-9.00) (-11.49) (-10.87) (-1.37) (-2.04) 
# Beds in the Hospital Sq 1.07e-06 1.18e-06 1.20e-06   1.06e-06 1.40e-06 1.36e-06 2.17e-07 3.34e-07 
 (6.37) (6.80) (4.85) (4.60) (5.59) (5.57) (1.18) (1.87) 
Short-term Hospital   -0.7216 -0.7276 -0.2013 -0.1504 0.0598 0.0013 -0.7357 -0.8043 
 (-18.86) (-18.69) (-3.88) (-2.93) (0.79) (0.02) (-12.34) (-12.15) 
Children’s Hospital  -0.1467 -0.1580 -0.0502 0.0126 0.0667 0.0149 -1.2898 -1.3715 
 (-1.06) (-1.15) (-0.35) (0.09) (0.43) (0.09) (-3.36) (-3.59) 
Psychiatric Hospital  0.9741 0.9049 -0.3058 -0.2921 0.0668 0.2043 0.1081 0.0041 
 (14.54) (13.58) (-1.80) (-1.70) (0.45) (1.39) (0.59) (0.02) 
Public Hospital  -0.2637 -0.2064 0.0166 0.0095 0.1301 0.1103 -0.0666 -0.0416 
 (-7.23) (-5.64) (0.47) (0.26) (3.23) (2.58) (-1.12) (-0.70) 
Teaching Hospital  -0.0939 -0.0883 -0.0812 -0.0851 -0.1284 -0.1414 0.0149 0.0223 
 (-2.24) (-2.12) (-1.97) (-2.06) (-3.00) (-3.23) (0.21) (0.31) 
Error Term Correlation (ρ) 0.8453 0.8889 0.8683 0.8818 0.8555 0.7888 0.9388 0.9446 
Wald Test for ρ=0 60.56 60.94 80.29 80.65 153.16 94.27 92.34 95.15 
No. of Observations 9,350 9,350 9,350 9,350 9,350 9,350 9,350 9,350 
Log Likelihood -5795.91 -5755.39 -8344.12 -8323.47 -8266.79 -8238.07 -5734.36 -5737.34 
a Only second-stage coefficients from bivariate probit models are reported.  Variable are defined the same as in Table 3-3.  t stats are reported in 
parenthesis using delta-method standard errors. 
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Table 3-10: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Outsourcing at Selected Points  
 
# Beds in the County 
Marginal Effects at Selected Points At 10 Beds At 1000 Beds At 10000 Beds 
 Clinical Laboratory 2.05e-05 1.95e-05 1.09e-05 
 Blood Bank 1.28e-05 1.20e-05 4.56e-06 
 Anatomical Laboratory -3.66e-06 -3.57e-06 -2.71e-06 
 CAT Scan 1.78e-05 1.72e-05 1.13e-05 
  
% of Small Hospitals (defined as # beds <= 21) 
Marginal Effects at Selected Points At 5% At 20% At 45% 
 Clinical Laboratory 0.2992 0.1862 -0.0021 
 Blood Bank 0.4232 0.2741 0.0257 
 Anatomical Laboratory 0.1991 0.1726 0.1283 
 CAT Scan 0.3637 0.2433 0.0425 
  
# Beds in the Hospital 
Marginal Effects at Selected Points At 10 Beds At 150 Beds At 400 Beds 
 Clinical Laboratory -5.94e-04 -5.04e-04 -3.44e-04 
 Blood Bank -1.09e-03 -9.31e-04 -6.50e-04 
 Anatomical Laboratory -1.39e-03 -1.19e-03 -8.28e-04 
 CAT Scan -4.96e-04 -4.36e-04 -3.30e-04 
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Table 3-11: Attenuation of Agglomeration Effects on Outsourcing Propensity a  
 Clinical Blood  Anatomical CAT 
 Laboratory Bank Laboratory Scan 
 Pr(OS|PV) Pr(OS|PV) Pr(OS|PV) Pr(OS|PV) 
Log (# Beds in the County_0-25) 0.0840 0.0461 0.0004 0.0695 
 (19.68) (8.45) (0.07) (8.31) 
Log(# Beds in the County _25-50) -0.0572 -0.0327 -0.0118 -0.0497 
 (-8.12) (-3.72) (-1.40) (-3.91) 
Log(# Beds in the County _50-75) 0.0196 -0.0053 -0.0024 0.0270 
 (2.22) (-0.49) (-0.23) (1.69) 
Log(# Beds in the County _75-100) -0.0067 -0.0118 -0.0081 -0.0009 
 (-0.98) (-1.40) (-1.05) (-0.07) 
% of Small Hospitals 
(below 0.3) 0.1551 0.2642 0.0794 0.2600 
 (3.41) (4.58) (1.36) (3.34) 
% of Small Hospitals  
(greater than or equal to 0.3)  -0.2514 -0.5648 -0.0953 -0.2847 
 (-3.14) (-5.68) (-0.74) (-1.96) 
Log(# Beds in the Hospital) -0.0953 -0.1265 -0.1577 -0.0598 
 (-18.56) (-20.76) (-28.26) (-5.74) 
Error Term Correlation (ρ) 0.8465 0.7976 0.8218 0.9542 
Wald Test for ρ=0 58.33 34.15 118.05 77.43 
No. of Observations 9,350 9,350 9,350 9,350 
Log Likelihood -5636.133 -8300.803 -8229.30 -5702.17 
a Marginal effects are calculated as the average of the marginal effects on the conditional probability for all 
observations based on the estimated coefficients.  Other control variables include indicators for short-term hospital,  
children’s hospital, psychiatric hospital, public hospital, and  teaching hospital, county-level measure of % of 
uninsured, % of > 65 years old, per capita income, % in poverty, % Black, % Hispanic, and % of < high school for the 
“provide” equation; indicators for short-term hospital,  children’s hospital, psychiatric hospital, public hospital, and  
teaching hospital for the “outsource” equation. These variable, along with the core regressors included in the table are 
defined the same as in Table 3-3. 
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Figure 3-1: State Variation in Mortality Rates (per 100,000 Residents) for Heart Disease 
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Figure 3-2: Distribution of Hospital Beds per 1,000 Residents in the U.S. 
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Figure 3-3: Proportional Sum Measure Based on Geographic Information System (GIS) Procedures 
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Figure 3-4: Marginal Effects of Local Population on Service Provision in a County 
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Figure 3-5: Decision Tree 
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Figure 3-6: Marginal Effects of Three Key Explanatory Variables with Quadratic Terms 
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Figure 3-7: Marginal Effects of Agglomeration Economies on the Propensity of Outsourcing 
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Chapter 4 Further Evidence On The Spatio-Temporal Model Of House Prices In The 
United States 
(Coauthored with Badi Baltagi) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The U.S. housing market has been through significant boom and bust in recent years.  
The U.S. housing price indexes, published by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), ran 
up by almost 40% from January 2003 to June 2006, followed by a 28% drop, unprecedented in 
the U.S. history.  Time series studies on housing price movements using the U.S. national data 
include Meen (2002) and Gallin (2006).  Also, Malpezzi (1999) uses a panel of 133 metropolitan 
areas in the USA over the period 1979 to 1996.  More recently, Holly, Pesaran, and Yamagata 
(2010) use a panel of 49 states over the period of 1975 to 2003 to show that state-level real 
housing prices are driven by economic fundamentals, such as real per capita disposable income, 
as well as by common shocks, such as changes in interest rates, oil prices, and technological 
change.  They apply the common correlated effects (CCE) estimator of Pesaran (2006) which 
takes into account spatial interactions that reflect both geographical proximity and unobserved 
common factors.  This estimator is consistent under heterogeneity and cross-sectional 
dependence.  It also copes with the presence of spatial effects, see Pesaran and Tosetti (2011).  
This study replicates the results of Holly, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2010), hereafter HPY, 
using a slightly different data set.  We first extend the period of study to 2010, incorporating the 
information reflected by the most recent housing market crash in 2007.  We also examine more 
refined geographical units focusing on Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) instead of state 
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level data.63  This level of aggregation is important because housing price fluctuations are 
generally considered a local phenomenon and are specific to economic integrated areas, such as 
an MSA. In fact, within a particular state, the extent to which housing prices appreciate or 
depreciate over a certain period of time varies significantly across locations.  For example, even 
in the same state, housing prices in New York City depreciated by 22.13%, from June of 2006 to 
January of 2012, while the similar depreciation rate in Syracuse, NY, over the same period, was 
only 3.47%. 
Using housing price indexes for 384 MSAs rather than 49 states, and over the period 
1975-2010, rather than 1975-2003, we find that the HPY results are fairly robust.  More 
specifically, after taking into account both cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity, we find 
a co-integrating relationship between real housing prices and real per capita disposable income.  
We also find that the degree of spatial correlation at the MSA level is slightly stronger than that 
found at the state level. 
4.2 Empirical evidence 
Following HPY, we report within and between correlation coefficients for both real 
housing prices and real per capita disposable income, but now at the MSA level rather than the 
state level. Tables 4-1 and 4-2 are comparable to Tables 3 and 4 in HPY.64   The general patterns 
demonstrated in these tables are consistent with the original findings: within region correlations 
tend to be larger than between region correlations.  This suggests a possible spatial pattern in 
both real housing prices and real per capita income. 
                                                 
63 MSAs are defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as urban centers of at least 10,000 population 
and adjacent areas that are socioeconomically tied to the urban centers by commuting. 
64 MSAs overlap state boundaries – there are three MSAs sitting on the boundaries of two Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) regions, and one MSA crosses the boundary of the East region and the Middle region.  In these 
cases, we assign the MSA to the region within which the larger portion of the MSA is located. 
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Cross-sectional dependence (CD) tests are reported in Table 4-3. These are comparable to 
Table 5 in HPY. These CD tests are statistically significant, with larger magnitudes than those 
reported by HPY. The average correlated coefficients of real housing prices, along with those 
associated with population growth and net cost of borrowing are around the same magnitudes as 
those reported in HPY. 
Pesaran’s CIPS test results that take into account cross-sectional dependence are reported 
in Table 4-4. These results are comparable to Table 6 of HPY. The same conclusions can be 
drawn from these test results as in HPY: real housing price indexes and real per capita income 
can be treated as I(1) processes especially if the trended nature of the series is taken into account, 
whereas population growth and net cost of borrowing should be considered as I(0) processes. 
The first column of Table 4-5 gives the naive mean group estimates. These are 
comparable to Table 7 in HPY. The estimate of the coefficient on income is 0.57 compared to 
0.30 For HPY. The other two columns report the common correlated effects mean group 
(CCEMG) and the common correlated effects pooled (CCEP) estimates.  The coefficients on 
income are 0.99 and 1.18 compared to 1.14 and 1.20 for HPY.  The residual cross-sectional 
dependence has been purged with the average error cross-correlation coefficient reduced from 
0.32 for the MG estimates to 0.022 and 0.026 for the CCEMG and CCEP estimates, respectively.	
We computed CIPS(p) panel unit root test statistics for log(real housing price)-log(real 
per capita income) including MSA specific intercepts, for different augmentation and lag orders, 
p = 1, 2, 3 and 4, and obtained the following statistics: -11.63, -10.46, -10.41, -3.90, 
respectively.65 Unit root in log(real housing price)-log(real per capita income) is rejected for all 
                                                 
65 Due to the unbalanced nature of the MSA house price panel used for analysis, only standardized Z[t-bar] statistics are 
computed.  
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the augmentation orders at 1% level.  We consider this as strong evidence for the cointegrating 
relationship between real housing prices and its fundamental market driver. 
Next, we estimate an error correction model without net cost of borrowing and population 
growth in Table 4-6.  This is comparable to Table 9 in HPY.	
The CCEMG and CCEP estimators are close and yield error correction coefficients of -
0.204(0.010) and -0.186(0.006).  This is close to the estimates reported in HPY: -0.183(0.016) 
and -0.171(0.015), respectively.  The average half-life estimates are around 3.3 years, much 
smaller than the half-life estimates of 5.1 years obtained using the MG estimators.  But the MG 
estimators are likely to be biased, since the residuals from these estimates show a high degree of 
cross-sectional dependence.  The same is not true of the CCE-type estimators.  By including 
population growth and net cost of borrowing, we also find a significant negative effect associated 
with net cost of borrowing and a significant positive effect for population growth, as shown in 
Table 4-7.  This is comparable to Table 10 in HPY. 
As shown in HPY, the strong dependence in overall residuals is captured by a common 
factor, whereas the remaining dependence across the idiosyncratic components captures weak 
cross-sectional dependence.  The former is addressed by a multi-factor decomposition and 
estimated by principle components.  The latter is identified using a spatial autoregressive model.  
Different from the spatial weight matrix generated based on contiguity between states in HPY, 
our spatial weight matrix is calculated based on row-standardized spatial distances between 
MSAs.66  The maximum likelihood estimates of the spatial coefficients for the number of factors 
specified as 1, 2, and 3, are 0.689(0.036), 0.491(0.023), and 0.348(0.019), respectively.67  These 
                                                 
66 This is calculated as the distance between the geographic centroids of these two MSAs. 
67 Note that our panel is unbalanced due to the fact that some MSAs start reporting housing price indexes much later than 1975. 
In order to overcome the missing data problem when applying the spatial autoregressive model, we use data from 1985 forward.  
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estimates are slightly larger than the state-level estimates reported in HPY.  
HPY obtain differential factor loadings by regressing	log(real housing price)-log(real per 
capita income) on their average over states and a constant, see their Table 11.  They find 
significantly negative factor loadings for New York, Massachusetts, and California.  We report a 
similar table with selected MSAs in Table 4-8.  The first two columns report factor loading 
estimates for the five largest MSAs in each of the three states.  The last two columns present all 
MSAs that are associated with negative and statistically significant factor loading estimates in 
our results.  We find that the estimated factor loadings for MSAs in New York, Massachusetts, 
and California tend to be positive.  In addition, MSAs that report negative factor loadings based 
on the new data set had positive factor loading estimates at the state level in HPY.  Despite this 
switch in sign perhaps due to looking at MSAs rather than states, HPY’s conclusion still holds: 
States that originally deviate from the equilibrating relationship tend to eventually revert. 
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Table 4-1: Average correlation coefficients within and between regions first difference of log real per capita income 
(i) Three geographical regions 
 East Middle West 
East 0.48 - - 
Middle 0.49 0.62 - 
West 0.35 0.39 0.34 
(ii) Eight BEA regions 
 New England Mid-East South-East Great Lakes Plains South-West Rocky mountain Far West 
New England 0.68 - - - - - - - 
Mid-East 0.58 0.58 - - - - - - 
South-East 0.47 0.47 0.46 - - - - - 
Great Lakes 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.68 - - - - 
Plains 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.56 0.55 - - - 
South-West 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.36 - - 
Rocky mountain 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.45 0.42 0.34 0.45 - 
Far West 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.44 0.39 0.25 0.38 0.39 
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Table 4-2: Average correlation coefficients within and between regions first difference of log real house prices 
(i) Three geographical regions 
 East Middle West 
East 0.50 - - 
Middle 0.37 0.68 - 
West 0.37 0.33 0.40 
(ii) Eight BEA regions 
 New England Mid-East South-East Great Lakes Plains South-West Rocky mountain Far West 
New England 0.86 - - - - - - - 
Mid-East 0.62 0.62 - - - - - - 
South-East 0.41 0.41 0.57 - - - - - 
Great Lakes 0.32 0.26 0.41 0.62 - - - - 
Plains 0.29 0.22 0.47 0.52 0.62 - - - 
South-West 0.16 0.21 0.45 0.21 0.45 0.56 - - 
Rocky mountain 0.08 0.16 0.46 0.38 0.50 0.47 0.57 - 
Far West 0.30 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.28 0.24 0.32 0.57 
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Table 4-3: Average Correlation Coefficients and CD Tests 
Average Correlation Coefficient 
 ADF(1) ADF(2) ADF(3) ADF(4) 
Log (real housing price index) 0.387 0.357 0.369 0.360 
Log (real per capita income) 0.423 0.368 0.361 0.301 
Population growth rate 0.047 0.044 0.046 0.042 
Real cost of borrowing 0.391 0.355 0.349 0.341 
CD test statistics1 
 ADF(1) ADF(2) ADF(3) ADF(4) 
Log (real housing price index) 512.94 460.10 466.41 448.22 
Log (real per capita income) 628.18 537.48 519.04 426.50 
Population growth rate 72.67 67.14 67.87 61.58 
Real cost of borrowing 483.41 426.35 408.86 390.55 
1 Under the null hypothesis of cross-section independence, CD test statistic ~ N(0,1). 
 
  
91 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-4: Pesaran’s CIPS panel unit root test results1  
      With an intercept 
 CADF(1) CADF(2) CADF(3) CADF(4) 
Log(real housing price index) -13.093*** -8.198*** -4.651*** -0.832 
Log(real per capita income) 0.211 1.719 0.674 -0.104 
∆Log(real housing price index) -15.237*** -12.062*** -9.239*** -1.512* 
∆Log(real per capita income) -35.868*** -18.676*** -8.155*** 1.140 
Population growth rate -19.586*** -10.935*** -4.938*** -0.118 
Real cost of borrowing -14.266*** -8.577*** -4.319*** 5.037 
      With an intercept and a linear trend 
 CADF(1) CADF(2) CADF(3) CADF(4) 
Log(real housing price index) -6.643*** 0.634 5.960 16.415 
Log(real per capita income) 11.886 14.260 13.486 12.474 
1 Under the null hypothesis of existing unit root, Z(t-bar) ~ N(0,1).  * signifies that the test is significant at the 10% level.  ** signifies that the test is 
significant at the 5% level.  *** signifies that the test is significant at the 1% level. 
 
92 
 
 
 
Table 4-5: Income Elasticity of Real Housing Price: 1975-2010 
 MG CCEMG CCEP 
Constant  1.1143 -5.2212 -0.6258 
 (0.448) (0.338) (0.412) 
Log(real per capital income) 0.5660 0.9920 1.1809 
 (0.061) (0.036) (0.070) 
Average Cross Correlation Coefficients 0.315 0.022 0.026 
CD test statistic 419.11 29.42 30.13 
Note: standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   
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Table 4-6: Panel Error Correction Estimates Without Net Cost of Borrowing and Population Growth: 1975-2010 
 MG CCEMG CCEP 
One period lag of Log(real housing 
price index) - Log(real per capital 
income) -0.1282 -0.2041 -0.1855 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
One period lag of ∆Log(real housing 
price index) 0.6769 0.3438 0.5478 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
∆Log(real per capita income) 0.3192 0.2307 0.4061 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.019) 
Half life 5.052 3.036 3.378 
Average cross-correlation coefficients 0.276 0.027 0.033 
CD test statistics 341.36 31.58 39.74 
Note: standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   
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Table 4-7: Panel Error Correction Estimates with Net Cost of Borrowing and Population growth: 1975-2010 
 MG CCEMG CCEP 
One period lag of Log(real housing price 
index) – Log(real per capital income) -0.1268 -0.1286 -0.1269 -0.1286 -0.2392 -0.2249 -0.2255 -0.2191 -0.2100 -0.2024 -0.2106 -0.2042 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
One period lag of ∆Log(real housing price 
index) 0.7262 0.7338 - - 0.0606 0.0651 - - 0.3806 0.4227 - - 
 (0.029) (0.029) - - (0.037) (0.034) - - (0.043) (0.039) - - 
∆Log(real per capita income) 0.3292 0.3183 0.3296 0.3184 0.2400 0.2153 0.2394 0.2317 0.3977 0.3910 0.5084 0.5040 
 (0.029) (0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.030) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Population growth rate 0.2274 - 0.2276 - 0.6893 - 0.6515 - 0.5165 - 0.7774 - 
 (0.047) - (0.049) - (0.110) - (0.100) - (0.089) - (0.090) - 
Real cost of borrowing 0.0654 0.0567 -0.6608 -0.6772 -0.1558 -0.2593 -0.2167 -0.3302 -0.1021 -0.1009 -0.4090 -0.4438 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.017) (0.018) (0.041) (0.038) (0.019) (0.018) (0.041) (0.037) (0.018) (0.017) 
Half life 5.110 5.035 5.107 5.035 2.535 2.721 2.712 2.803 2.941 3.065 2.931 3.035 
Average cross-correlation coefficients 0.266 0.283 0.273 0.286 0.020 0.023 0.022 0.025 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.032 
CD test statistics 329.28 350.85 340.50 355.99 22.98 27.43 25.84 30.09 37.60 36.97 39.14 37.76 
Note: standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   
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Table 4-8: Factor Loading Estimates for Selected MSAs: 1975-2010 
MSAs Estimates MSAs Estimates 
New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ 1.08** (0.43) Anniston-Oxford, AL -0.14** (0.06) 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.22 (0.66) Clarksville, TN-KY -0.70*** (0.13) 
Rochester, NY 0.15 (0.42) Columbus, IN -0.32** (0.13) 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.96** (0.41) Danville, VA -0.24* (0.12) 
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 2.05*** (0.51) Fayetteville, NC -1.13** (0.42) 
Boston-Quincy, MA 1.18** (0.58) Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL -0.30*** (0.09) 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 1.47*** (0.48) Goldsboro, NC -0.39* (0.19) 
Worcester, MA 1.23** (0.52) Jackson, TN -0.58* (0.29) 
Springfield, MA 0.86* (0.49) Lafayette, IN -0.61*** (0.16) 
Barnstable Town, MA 3.50*** (0.44) Laredo, TX -0.49* (0.28) 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 2.03*** (0.43) Lawton, OK -0.80** (0.31) 
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA 1.55*** (0.45) Pine Bluff, AR -0.32** (0.15) 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 2.86*** (0.46) Terre Haute, IN -0.35** (0.14) 
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville, CA 2.23*** (0.39) Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR -0.45** (0.19) 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1.60*** (0.44) Tuscaloosa, AL -0.16*  (0.08) 
  Victoria, TX -0.46*  (0.23) 
Note: standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  * signifies that the test is significant at the 10% level.  ** signifies that the test 
is significant at the 5% level.  *** signifies that the test is significant at the 1% level. 
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